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From Cotton Curtain to Iron Curtain: Black Americans' Reaction to The Hungarian
Crisis of 1956 and 1957 (112 pp.)
Director: Michael Mayer

This thesis examines the reaction of black Americans to the Hungarian Crisis of 1956
and 1957. While most Americans poured forth their sympathy for the Hungarian victims
of the Soviet Union's brutal invasion, black Americans called attention to both past and
contemporary examples of aggression against the peoples of Asia and Africa. Black
Americans also pointed to their own fight for equality, and the indifference and violent
resistance that it so often encotmtered. Chapter I of this thesis examines the reaction of
black Americans in light of their own unique historical experience. Chapter II provides
an overall background to the Hungarian Crisis, a discussion of the Eisenhower
administration's decision making during the Crisis, and an examination of the generally
sympathetic response on the part of the mainstream press and general public. Chapter III
provides the main body of this thesis. This chapter utilizes major black newspapers, the
works of prominent black leaders, and letters sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower to
present the often bitter and angry reaction of black Americans to their nation's decision to
transport and provide asylimi to some 32,000 Hungarian refugees. Underlying black
Americans' unfavorable reaction to America's efforts to save the Hungarian refugees was
their belief that their nation did not care unless the victims of oppression happened to be
white. In addition, black Americans worried what the influx of a such a large number of
white immigrants would do to their only recently acquired, and still very tenuous,
socioeconomic and political rights.
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INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOURCES

The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 produced a wave of American sympathy unlike
few other foreign events had before, or have since. The United States and the world
watched in horror as the Soviet Union sent in troops to crush the rebellion sweeping
through this small satellite nation. The Eisenhower administration first sought to employ
the United Nations and personal diplomacy to secure the removal of Soviet troops. When
these efforts failed and the Soviets continued their invasion, the Eisenhower
administration was left wdth a difficult choice. Since the end of World War II, America
had hoped for the eventual "liberation" of the Soviet dominated nations of Eastern
Europe. Some critics even argued that the United States had directly incited the
Himgarian Rebellion in an attempt to achieve this eventual end. However, by providing
military aid to Hungary's rebels, America would risk provoking an all-out war, or even a
potential nuclear holocaust. For this reason, and others, the Eisenhower administration
ruled out the use of force on behalf of Hungary. Instead, the administration proposed that
thousands of Hungarian refugees be provided transportation to and refuge in the United
States. This decision launched one of the most massive refugee relief efforts ever
undertaken by the American government. The majority within the mainstream press and
general public not only accepted this decision, they actively participated in the refugee
effort and even pushed for greater action on the part of their government.
The unique history and experience of black Americans, however, led them to a
very different perspective on the Hungarian Crisis. By 1956, when Americans began
1
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their incredible outpouring of aid, praise, and sympathy for Hungary, black Americans
had been waiting almost a century for a similar response to their struggle and plight.
Black Americans had willingly answered their nation's call to go overseas and help save
oppressed peoples in World War 1 and World War II. In both wars, black Americans'
desire to serve their country was met with hostility and discrimination. While black
Americans did achieve some substantial gains as a result of their participation in these
conflicts, particularly World War II, these advances fell far short of the full and equal
citizenship they had hoped for. Their nation's failure to grant them the privileges due
them as citizens left many black Americans pessimistic about their role in American
society.
With the emergence of the Cold War, however, black Americans once again lent
their support to their nation. Like most other Americans of the 1950s, black Americans
adopted the prevailing anti-communist stance of the day. However, in spite of their past
and continued loyalty, the demands of black Americans for equality were often viewed
suspiciously as being "communist inspired." Then, after many legal battles, the Supreme
Court ruled segregated schools imconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).
Once again, the hopes of black Americans soared. However, two year later in 1956,
segregation in education and elsewhere remained a cruel reality. Instead of receiving
support, or even grudging compliance, Brown v. Board of Education touched off a violent
backlash and widespread resistance to desegregation.
The growing bitterness and frustration of black Americans would play an
important role in their reaction to their nation's offers of aid and support to the
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Hungarians, particularly the decision to assist thousands of Hungarian refugees in
emigrating to the United States. The black community was not so much angry with the
Himgarians themselves, as with the intense display of sympathy and support on the part
of the United States government and the American people as a whole. Americans'
support for the Hungarians came at a time when many individuals and groups, in and out
of government, displayed indifference, or sometimes even outright hostility, to the fight
against racism. Black Americans, understandably, felt hurt and betrayed that their own
government and fellow citizens seemed to care more about the plight of foreigners
thousands of miles away, than they did about the violence perpetrated against the
American Negro in the South.
In addition to racism at home, black Americans resented what they saw as
American support for imperialism overseas. As black Americans increasingly began to
identify their plight with that of colored nations arovmd the world, they began to view a
clear racial line in both the foreign and domestic policies of the United States. Black
Americans still remembered what they perceived as the rather indifferent attitude of their
nation toward Benito Mussolini's brutal invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s. They also
pointed to the continued indifference on the part of many Americans to more
contemporary examples of brutality against colored peoples in Suez, Kenya, Algeria, and
South Afi-ica.
Added to their perception that their nation did not care unless the victims of
oppression happened to be white, was black Americans' historical memory of the
negative impact of white immigration on the status of the American Negro. In the early
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years of industrialization, black Americans faced intense competition for employment
opportimities with recently arrived immigrants from Europe. In this struggle, black
Americans usually found themselves on the losing end. Much of the economic progress
achieved by black Americans came as a direct result of the sudden decline in European
immigration brought about by World War I. Their unpleasant experiences with European
immigration left a lingering strain of nativism within the black community. This
nativism would reemerge in full force wdth the Himgarian Crisis. By the 1950s, black
Americans had made some important, though limited, advances. Thus, they greeted the
news that thousands of Hungarian refugees would soon arrive on their nation's shores
with fear and suspicion. Black Americans worried what the influx of a such a large
number of white immigrants would do to their only recently acquired, and still very
tenuous, socioeconomic and political gains.
This thesis primarily utilizes articles, editorials, and statements found throughout
the black press. It also draws on the works of prominent black leaders and letters sent to
President Dwight D. Eisenhower by black Americans opposing Hungarian refugee relief.
When arguing that these sources represented black opinion, it is recognized that they
leave out the very poor, illiterate, and rural blacks who did not have access to major
newspapers and probably did not consider writing Eisenhower personally. It recognizes
that it only encompasses the opinions of black leaders, editors and columnists for major
newspapers, or those black Americans who cared enough and were able to take the time
to either write to their newspaper or Eisenhower himself. Within these constraints,
however, it seeks to represent a diversity of sources of black opinion. It includes
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Southern as well as Northern newspapers. It further includes black newspapers which
were traditionally Democratic and those which supported the Republican party. In
addition, it also discusses the few cases where black Americans did voice support for
and/or participate in Hungarian refugee relief.
While there are certainly some problems with arguing that the views of prominent
black leaders, improvement organizations, and those voiced in major newspapers
represented those of all black Americans, it remains reasonable to argue that they did in
fact represent the opinions of a large majority of black Americans in the 1950s. By the
1950s, America's black population had gone from being overwhelmingly Southem and
rural to Northern and urban. Even those blacks who remained in the South began
increasingly to migrate to urban centers like Atlanta, Georgia. Urbanization played a
vital role in increasing the power and influence of the black press and improvement
organizations, like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). Prior to the urbanization of black America, improvement organizations and
black newspapers tended to speak to a very small minority of elite black leaders.
However, by the end of World War II, the circulation of black newspapers and
membership in the NAACP had reached the hundreds of thousands.
Urbanization not only allowed institutions like the NAACP and the black press to
expand their influence, it also, in tum, allowed increasing numbers of average black
Americans to influence the direction and policy of such organizations. The NAACP,
which depended on political support and cash donations from thousands of black
Americans from all walks of life, could not simply ignore the views of such individuals.

By the 1950s, the black press had moved from being primarily supported by subsidies
provided by a limited number of private individuals and organizations, to depending
almost entirely on sales and subscriptions. The urbani2ation of black America required
that its leaders, organizations, and media now remain more cognizant of the views and
issues of importance to average black Americans. By the middle of the 1950s, these
institutions both reflected and helped mold the opinions of a large majority, if not all,
black Americans. As such, they stand as valid and reliable sources through which to
examine the opinions of black Americans in generail, and to the Hungarian Crisis in
particular.

CHAPTER I: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL FACTORS
CONDITIONING THE RESPONSE OF BLACK AMERICANS TO THE
HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956 AND 1957

The often angry and bitter reaction of black Americans to the United States'
Hungarian refugee relief effort of 1956-1957 can best be understood in light of the
historical experience of black Americans. The urbanization of black America allowed for
the growth of key institutions, including the Negro press and improvement societies.
However, urbanization also brought black Americans into increased contact and
competition with European immigrants. The experiences of black Americans and
immigrants in the early years of industrialization left a bitter and suspicious attitude
toward white iimnigration on the part of many black Americans. The experience of
World War I and World War II also helped condition the reaction of black Americans to
arrival of the Hungarian reftigees. Throughout these conflicts, black Americans
sacrificed a great deal. However, despite the gains they did achieve, the social, political,
and economic status of black Americans continued to lag far behind that of white
Americans. By 1956 the Cold War had set in, the Afro-Asian block was coming into its
own, and the fioisfration of black Americans was on the rise. In addition to their
frustration with their own condition, black Americans came increasingly to believe that
their nation only cared about oppression overseas when it involved a white European
nation.
Black Americans first began moving North in substantial numbers in the decades
following the Civil War. They came in search of better employment opportunities,
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greater freedom of movement, and to escape the often violent resistance to the exercise of
their newly acquired rights. This urbanization created the necessary conditions for the
emergence of a number of black newspapers and improvement organizations. The late
nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a tremendous growth in the niunber of black
periodicals. The founding of the Baltimore Afro-American came in 1892; the Norfolk
Journal and Guide in 1899; Boston Globe in 1901; and the Chicago Defender and
Pittsburgh Courier in 1905. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century also gave
rise to organizations like the National Association of Colored Women in 1895; The
National Business League in 1900; the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) in 1909; and the National Urban League (NUL) in 1911.
These and countless smaller organizations provided a format in which black Americans
could vent their frustration at their continued discrimination and formulate strategies by
which to improve their condition. Throughout the twentieth century, the Negro Press
and improvement societies would play a crucial role in both molding and giving voice to
the opinion of black Americans.'
While the migration of black Americans from the rural South to the urban areas of

'John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans,
Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 435-436 & 444-451; E. Franklin
Frazier, The Negro in the United States, Revised Edition (New York: MacMillan, 1957),
pp. 523-526; Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom: The Story of the NAACP (New York:
W.W. Norton & Compainy, Inc., 1962), pp. 22-23; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The
History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New
York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 97-98; Arnold M. Rose, The Negro in Postwar America
(Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith: 1950), pp. 10 & 24-25; and Monroe N. Work
(ed.), Negro Yearbook: An Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro, 1918-1919 (Alabama; The
Negro Year Book Publishing Company, 1919), pp, 454-472.
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the North brought some improvement in their condition, black Americans continued to
encoimter enormous obstacles in their search economic security. One of the greatest
constraints on upward mobility for black Americans arose from their intense competition
for employment and housing with white immigrants. Though immigrants often faced
discrimination and hostility as well, their status nearly always remained above that of
black Americans. Most employers expressed preference for immigrant over black
workers. In addition, many immigrants seemed all too quick to adopt a hostile and racist
attitude toward American blacks. This social ranking translated into greater economic
opportunities for the white European immigrants, often at the expense of America's black
citizens. Black Americans were almost universally excluded from the higher paying
industrial occupations, and instead, confined to lower paying personal service
professions. However, in times of economic downturn black Americans faced loss of
even these occupations to white immigrants. These factors combined to make black
Americans suspicious and resentful towards European immigration.^
The "new immigration" that began in the 1880s ftirther aggravated the animosity
between America's native blacks and its European immigrants. By the end of the 1870s,
black Americans had begun to secure some socioeconomic mobility. Black Americans,
though still severely limited in their opportunities for advancement, began in increasing

^Herman D. Bloch, The Circle of Discrimination: An Economic and Social Study
of the Black Man in New York (New York: New York University Press, 1969), pp. 34-46;
David J. Hell wig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929,"
Journal of Negro History 66 (Summer 1981): pp. 110-127; and Kluger, Simple Justice,
pp. 88 & 100.
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numbers to enter industrial positions from which they had previously been excluded.
However, just as black Americans were on the verge of increased economic
opportunities, a new wave of immigrants, mostly from Italy and Eastern Europe, arrived
on America's shores. This new influx of white immigrants presented black Americans
with even greater competition for unskilled to semi-skilled industrial employment. Fewer
job opportimities, in turn, slowed the ongoing migration of black Americans to Northern
urban centers. By 1910, what had been rapidly growing populations of black Americans
in many Northern cities began to slowly level off.^
World War I, however, brought new opportunities for black Americans. Once
again, they began migrating in large numbers to Northern industrial centers. By 1920,
330,000 black Americans had migrated either to the Northern or Western areas of the
United States. This time, however, they had little to no immigrant competition. Almost
overnight. World War I eliminated nearly all European immigration. World War I also
generated a booming defense industry and a labor shortage. The lack of immigrant
competition, combined with the manpower needs of World War I, opened up industrial
employment opportunities that had previously been entirely out of reach of most black
Americans. Large numbers of black Americans secured employment in munitions
factories, steel plants, shipbuilding, foodstuffs, and many other war related industries. A
particularly striking example of the inroads made by black workers can be seen in

^John E. Bodnar, "The Impact of the 'New Immigration' on the Black Worker:
Steelton, Pennsylvania, \%2>0-\92Qr Labor History 17 (Spring 1976): pp. 214-229 and
Frazier, The Negro in the United States,.^. 190.
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Pittsburgh's steel industry. In 1910, Pittsburgh's steel plants employed fewer than 100
black workers. By 1923, this number had skyrocketed to 17,000."
The Negro press played an important role in persuading Southern blacks to move
Northward and take advantage of the opportimities afforded by World War I. The
Christian Recorder declared that "if a million Negroes move North and West...it will be
one of the greatest things for the Negro since the Emancipation Proclamation."^ The
overwhelming response to the call to come North created the conditions in which the
black news media and improvement organizations could expand their influence to larger
numbers of black Americans. However, the growing importance of the black press also
generated hostility and suspicion. In some areas of the South, possession of a black
newspaper meant possible jail time, mob violence, or both. The federal government also
kept a close eye on the black media. Fearftil of the growing power of the black press, the
War Department and the Committee on Public Information requested a meeting with
leading members of the black media. At this meeting, government officials suspiciously
questioned those present as to just where the black press stood on the war effort. In
addition, the United States' Attorney General, Mitchell Palmer, placed a number of black
periodicals on his list of "subversive" organizations. Palmer also had A. Philip

"Theodore Hemmingway, "Prelude to Change: Black Carolinians in the War
Years, l9\4-\920" Journal of Negro History 65 (Summer 1980): pp. 212-227; Franklin,
From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 472-473; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 193
& 598-599; Hellwig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929,
p. 110; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 100 & 110-111; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook,
1918-1919, vp. 8-12.
^Quoted in Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9.

Randolph, editor of The Messenger, arrested for alleged disloyalty.^
Rather than encouraging disloyalty or subversion as so often accused, most black
leaders instead urged their fellow black Americans to remain loyal and do all they could
to further America's war effort. Through his writings in The Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois
advised his readers that it was time to "forget our special grievances and close ranks
shoulder to shoulder with our white citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for
democracy.'" In May of 1917 the NAACP, meeting with other improvement
organizations, adopted a series of resolutions which called on black Americans to "join
heartily in this fight."* In spite of Germany's repeated efforts to sway the loyalty of
America's black citizens, particularly those of Southern origin, black Americans
remained relatively indifferent to German propaganda.® Thomas Lykes, a black poet

®August Meier and Elliott M. Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto: An
Interpretive History of American Negroes (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), pp. 191192; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 462-463 & 472; Frazier, The Negro in the
United States, pp. 509-512 & 527-528; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 47-48; and Work
(ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 8-10.
'Quoted in Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 476 and Paul Gordon Lauren,
Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1988), p. 73.
^Quoted in Jane L. and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the
Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.). Black
Labor in America (Westport; Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 115.
'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 464-465, Hemmingway, "Prelude to
Change," pp. 217-218; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 45-46; Lauren, Power and
Prejudice, p. 73; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 193-194; Scheiber,
"The Wilson Administration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black Americans 19171918," in Cantor (comp.), Black Labor in America, pp. 114-119; and Work (ed.), Negro
Yearbook 1918-1919, pp. 45-46.
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writing from South Carolina, gave somewhat comical expression to the loyal intentions of
black Americans: "Two lands alone I know and love [o]ur country and the one
above...these were his answers to...the enemy...German spy doggone, begone [o]r I will
smack your face with a liberty bond.'""
The massive response to the call of black leaders to "close ranks" and "join
heartily in this fight" can be seen in the large numbers of average black Americans who
actively sought out military service. These individuals knew that in order to claim full
citizenship in America, they had to gain the right to fight for their coimtry. Black
Americans seldom sought military exemption, and in fact, expressed disappointment and
resentment when draft boards turned them away. By the time World War I ended, over
300,000 black Americans had served in their nation's armed forces. When allowed to
participate in combat, black Americans proved willing to risk their lives to prove their
loyalty and ability as soldiers. A substantial number of black soldiers received official
commendation from the French High Command, including the prestigious "Croix de
Guerre," for bravery in battle."
Despite their willingness to serve, black soldiers often faced tremendous
discrimination and hostility in the armed forces. They were excluded entirely from the
marines and aviation, and allowed to serve only as cooks or messmen in the Navy. In

'"Quoted in Hemmingway, "Prelude to Change," p. 217.
"Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 455-470; Hemmingway, "Prelude to
Change," pp. 214-216; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 45-46; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp.
109-110; and Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 193; and Work (ed.),
Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 98-99 & 215-232.
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whatever capacity they served, black servicemen encountered menial assignments, slow
promotions, and almost entire separation from white soldiers. Black soldiers who served
under white command often endured daily insults and uimecessarily harsh working and
living conditions. The presence of black soldiers in training camps around the nation also
met with intense hostility on the part of many local communities. Black soldiers foimd
themselves excluded from eating and recreational facilities, ridiculed, harassed, and even
assaulted by white civilians. However, perhaps the most demeaning example of
discrimination came from the United States govenunent itself. On August 17, 1918
America's military commander, General Pershing, informed the French High Command
of the "differing nature" of black American soldiers. Pershing went on to request that
French military persormel strictly limit their social contact with black American soldiers
and avoid praising them too profusely.'^
Black Americans on the home front demonstrated a similar eagerness to
contribute to the war effort in spite of continued discrimination. Though World War I
vastly increased the economic means of many black Americans, they still remained one
of America's poorest groups of citizens. Despite this lower economic status, however,
black Americans contributed heavily to the United States' efforts to raise money for the
war. They were heavily represented in the purchase of Liberty War Bonds and War

'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 458-461; Hemmingway, "Prelude to
Change," pp. 215-216; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 38-42; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp.
109-110; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 73; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to
Ghetto, pp. 192-193; Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime
Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.). Black Labor in
America, pp. 119-126; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 79-81 & 94-96.
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Savings Stamps. In addition, as a group, black Americans donated large amounts of time
and money to organizations like the Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and the United War Work
Campaign. All told, black Americans contributed over two million dollars to their
nation's war effort. This massive financial contribution came at a time when the
administration of Woodrow Wilson did little to respond to the pleas of black leaders to
step in and take action to stop the lynchings and race riots occurring around the nation.'^
The black community had sacrificed along with the rest of America, and naturally
expected that the end of World War I would bring rewards for their patience, loyalty, and
service. W.E.B. Du Bois expressed the sentiments of many black Americans when he
declared: "We return...Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the
Great Jehovah, we will save it in the U.S.A or know the reason why.'"'* However, despite
some economic gains as a byproduct of the labor shortage, black Americans received few
direct returns for their efforts in World War I. When the rewards for their contributions
did not materialize, the hopeful optimism with which many black Americans had greeted
World War I rapidly gave way to disillusionment and pessimism over their future as
American citizens. For black Americans, the discrepancy between Woodrow Wilson's
pledge to "Make the World Safe for Democracy" and the harsh reality of racism at home

'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 470-471; Hemmingway, "Prelude to
Change," pp. 216-217; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 110-111; Meier and Rudwick, From
Plantation to Ghetto, p. 192; and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, pp. 45-51.
'"•Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 99.
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became increasingly difficult to ignore.
Black soldiers felt this frustration even more profoundly than those on the home
front. Their service in France provided them vdth a stark contrast to their lives at home.
Though their treatment of colonial peoples left much to be desired, the French
government imposed no racial restrictions on black American soldiers. The French, in
fact, treated black Americ^ soldiers as heroes, just as they did white American soldiers.
This social equality and easy mixing of the races came as a shock to many black
Americans, and forever affected their willingness to accept anything less. As a result of
their wartime experience, black soldiers returned home with a growing determination to
not rest imtil their nation accepted them as fiill social, economic, and political equals. It
was no accident that many of the leaders of the later Civil Rights Movement spent time
overseas in the United States military.'^
World War I also served to increase the knowledge and interest of many
Americans, including black Americans, in international affairs. While some black
Americans had always recognized the link between the condition of the American Negro
and events overseas. World War I deepened this recognition and brought it to an

'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 476-479; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp.
110-113, Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 194-196; Lauren, Power
and Prejudice, pp. 99-100; and Scheiber, "The Wilson Administration and the Wartime
Mobilization of Black Americans, 1917-1918," in Milton Cantor (comp.), Black Labor in
America, pp. 135-136.
'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 476-479; Hughes, Fight for Freedom,
pp. 45-46; Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 110-111; Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 99100; and Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 194-196.
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expanded, though still limited, number of black Americans. This increased knowledge of
world events, in turn, generated a greater sense of identification with colored nations
around the world. The organization of the first Pan-African Conference by Du Bois and
the NAACP demonstrated a growing awareness among leading black Americans that
their success in fighting racism at home depended on the end of racism and imperialism
everywhere. However, at this point in history, Pan-Africanism remained the purview of a
relatively small group of elite black leaders. It would take Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in
the 1930s, and later World War II and the Cold War, to bring a more international
perspective on racism to the majority of black Americans."
In the years directly following World War I, however, black Americans returned
to concentrating primarily on domestic issues. One of the most important concerns of
black Americans in the 1920s was preserving the economic opportunities seciired in
World War I. Black Americans clearly recognized the link between their socioeconomic
status and European immigration. This recognition generated strong nativist sentiments
within the black community. These sentiments can be seen in the words of Philadelphia's
Christian Recorder: "The Negro...speaks the language...knows the customs...and is
physically the equal and morally the superior of the immigrant from Europe.'"® The
understandable desire of black Americans to preserve their economic gains, ironically, led

'^Franklin Williams, "Blacks and American Foreign Affairs," The Crisis
(December 1980); pp. 533-538; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 470; Hughes,
Fight for Freedom, p. 50; and Lauren, Power and Prejudice, pp. 77-79.
'^Quoted in Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9.

many to support the efforts of racist organizations, like the Klu Kiux Klan, to tighten
immigration laws. Black Americans, however, also experienced enormous conflict on the
immigration issue. While recognizing the economic benefits of ending immigration,
black Americans felt very uncomfortable with the tendency of others supporting
inmiigration restrictions to emphasize racial characteristics. For black Americans, the
solution lay in increasing the percentage of immigrants coming from Asia and Africa,
while at the same time, reducing the numbers arriving from Europe.'®
The Great Depression slowed industrialization and urbanization for all Americans,
including black Americans. However, as a result of the earlier mass migrations of the
industrial era and World War I, large numbers of black Americans remained concentrated
in urban areas. In addition, black Americans continued to migrate to the cities, albeit at a
slower rate than they had in the previous decades. In spite of the Depression, the
economic and political awareness of urban blacks continued to grow throughout the
1930s. This growing awareness can be seen in the successful use of economic coercion
to protest inequitable treatment. Of the numerous black sponsored boycotts of the 1930s,
St. Louis' "Jobs-for-Negroes" movement and Harlem's "Don't Buy Where You Can't
Work" or "Buy Black" campaigns drew the most attention and had the greatest impact.
These and other, similar, boycotts targeted white businesses which, while catering
primarily to black customers, refiised to employ black workers. Through picketing, word
of mouth, and news releases, black leaders put the word out that their communities

'^Hellwig, "Black Leaders and United States Immigration Policy, 1917-1929," pp.
110-127 and Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1918-1919, p. 9.
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should immediately discontinue patronage of such businesses. These economic boycotts,
coming in the midst of the Great Depression, had a devastating effect on white businesses
which continued to discriminate. In tum, these economic campaigns provided a much
needed boost to black business.^"
The 1930s also witnessed an early example of the increasingly important role of
the Negro vote. In 1930 Herbert Hoover nominated John J. Parker, a little known federal
judge, to the Supreme Court. The NAACP, however, learned that earlier in his career
Parker had made racist statements regarding the participation of black Americans in the
democratic process. The NAACP first attempted to discover if Parker still held such
views. When Parker failed to disavow his earlier statements, the NAACP mobilized
black voters to come out against his nomination. The NAACP recognized that if enough
black Americans, particularly those concentrated in Northern urban areas, put pressure on
their Congressmen to oppose Parker's nomination, they could keep him off the Supreme
Court. Though other forces, particularly labor, played a role as well, the defeat of the
Parker nomination clearly indicated the growing power of the Negro vote.^'
During the 1930s, the NAACP also stepped up its efforts to secure greater
employment and educational opportunities for black Americans. The NAACP challenged
the discriminatory employment practices of the Tennessee Valley Project. The NAACP's

^"Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 539-540 eind Hughes, Fight for
Freedom, pp. 81-82
^'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 529; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 7475; and Kluger, Simple Justice, pp. 141-144.
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Thurgood Marshall launched a series of court battles on behalf of equal pay for black
teachers. However, of all its diverse activities during the 1930s, the NAACP's attack on
the legal principles upholding segregation had the greatest long term impact. Since the
Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which upheld Louisiana's Public
Accommodation Law requiring separate accommodations for black passengers, the legal
doctrine of "separate but equal" had stood firm. However, beginning in the 1930s, the
NAACP's legal staff, concluded that Plessy might be best challenged by attacking not the
separateness, but rather the inequality, of various educational and transportation facilities
throughout the South. The NAACP could easily point to case after case where facilities
reserved for blacks remained clearly unequal. Throughout the 1930s, the NAACP would
successfully argue a number of cases before the Supreme Court based on this formula.
The NAACP also pointed to the possibility that racial separation could, in the future, be
challenged as inherently unequal. The activities of the NAACP, continuing even in the
midst of the Depression, demonstrated the growing political consciousness of black
Americans. Their legal battles also laid the groundwork for Brown v. Board of Education
(1954).22
In addition to actively seeking to improve their own status, black Americans in
the 1930s also concerned themselves with their colored brethren in the small African
nation of Ethiopia. For black Americans, Ethiopia stood as the ultimate symbol of the
achievement of colored people. Of all the African nations, only Ethiopia had remained

^"Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 74-75 & 134-139 and Kluger, Simple Justice,
pp. 131-138, 163-165,168-172, & 186-195.
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independent after the onslaught of European imperialism. In December of 1934, fighting
between Italian and Ethiopian troops broke out. It became increasingly clear that
Mussolini intended to use this fighting as a pretext to invade Ethiopia. Black Americans
desperately sought to convince their government to do something to prevent this
impending invasion. While many Americans may have felt some sympathy for Ethiopia,
the intense fear of another world war led many Americans to press their government to
stay completely out of this conflict. Instead of initiating action on behalf of Ethiopia, the
United States government passed neutrality legislation, instituted an arms embargo, and
looked the other way as Mussolini proceeded with his merciless invasion.
When they failed to move their government toward favorable action on behalf of
Ethiopia and the dreaded invasion came, black Americans took numerous steps to provide
aid and comfort to the Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression. They sent resolutions to
the League of Nations, held rallies to raise money, sent medical supplies and personnel,
and laimched a massive public education campaign. Some black Americans even set out
to raise volunteer fighting units. Even as black Americans sought to save Ethiopia,
Italian-Americans instituted their own campaign to raise money for Italy's armies. This
display of support for Mussolini, who was clearly the aggressor, infiiriated black
Americans. To register their opposition, thousands of black Americans boycotted
businesses of Italian-Americans, which they believed were fiirmeling funds to Mussolini.
The rriass participation among the black community alerted a greater number of black
Americans to events overseas and enhanced their sense of international racial solidarity.
It also represented one of the earliest cases where black Americans vocally and forcefully
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opposed the foreign policy of the United States.
For black Americans, the coming of World War II meant renewed urbanization
and economic opportunities. Once again, large numbers of black Americans began
migrating from Southern rural areas to urban areas in the North and West. In many ways,
this migration looked very similar to the earlier migrations of black Americans.
However, the numbers of black Americans leaving the South during World War II far
exceeded what had come before. Despite the earlier migrations, two-thirds of America's
black population still lived in the South in 1940. The vast majority of these Southern
blacks still lived in isolated rural areas and worked in low paying agricultural
occupations. Between 1941 and 1945 nearly one million black Americans left these rural
areas in search of industrial employment. The labor shortage created by World War II
enabled large numbers of these migrants to secure the employment they sought. As a
direct result of World War II, the estimated number of black Americans working in
manufacturing or related industries rose by 600,000.^'*

^^Jake Miller, The Black Presence in American Foreign Affairs (Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 247-248; Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising
Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 37-53; Red Ross, "Black Americans and Italo-Ethiopian
Relief 1935-1936," Ethiopian Observer 15, no. 2 (1972): pp. 122-131; and Lauren,
Power and Prejudice, pp. 119-120.

^"Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution,"
Journal of American History 55 (June 1968): pp. 90-106; Jessie Parkhurst Guzman (ed.),
Negro Year Book: A Review of Events Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946 (Alabama: The
Department of Records and Research Tuskegee Institute, 1947), pp. 134-136; John
Modell, Marc Goulden, and Sigurdur Magnusson, "World War II in the Lives of Black
Americans: Some Findings and an Interpretation," Journal of American History 76

23

As in World War I, black Americans faced discrimination and hostility in their
efforts to secure employment in America's war industries. During the early years of
World War II, defense plants either turned black Americans away or placed them in low
paid menial occupations. For example, in 1940 the rapidly expanding aircraft industry
enunciated its policy that: "The Negro will be considered only as janitors and in other
similar capacities."^^ Hostility towards the employment of black Americans in war
industries also sparked race riots around the nation. One of the worst of such riots
occurred in Detroit, Michigan. The beginnings of this riot lay in a strike at a Packard
factory making jet bomber engines for the war effort. In protest against the employment
of black workers, over twenty thousand white workers walked off the job. One striker
was reported to have declared: "I'd rather see Hitler and Hirohito win the war than work
beside a nigger on the assembly line."^® The strike aggravated the already tense racial
climate in Detroit. By June of 1942, these elevated racial tensions erupted into a riot
which left 34 people dead and around a million dollars of property damaged.^'

(December 1989): pp. 838-848; Neil A. Wynn, "The Impact of the Second World War on
the American Negro," Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 2 (1971): pp. 42-53;
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 597; and Frazier, The Negro in the United States,
pp. 196 & 214-218.
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In spite of such examples of resistance toward their employment in war industries,
black Americans had far greater success in fighting employment discrimination in World
War II than they had in World War I. The increased power of black Americans to fight
discrimination can be seen in the March on Washington Movement. Even before
America entered the war, A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, threatened to lead thousands of black workers in a massive march on the
nation's capitol in an effort to secure more equitable treatment in the nation's defense
industries. The prospect of such a march presented President Franklin D. Roosevelt with
a potentially embarrassing display of low morale on America's home front. Roosevelt
urged Randolph to think of America's international image, and begged him to call of the
march. Initially, Randolph stood his ground and refused to do any such thing. However,
after extensive bargaining, Randolph and Roosevelt reached an agreement. In return for
Randolph calling off the scheduled march, Roosevelt issued Executive Order #8002,
which forbade discrimination in government employment and in companies receiving
government contracts. Roosevelt also set up the Fair Employment Practice Committee
(FEPC) to overseas the enforcement of this order. While the FEPC had little real power,
it did provide some increased economic opportunities for black Americans.^^

the American Negro," p. 46.
^^Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 98-99;
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 578-579; Frazier, The Negro in the United
States, pp. 631-614; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 85-86; Meier and Rudwick, From
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25

The experience of black Americans in the armed forces during World War II
resembled the somewhat mixed bag of substantial advances mixed with continued
discrimination that characterized their search for equality on the home front. During
World War II, black Americans had far greater opportunities for military service than
they had in the previous war. The Selective Service Act of 1940 contained an important
amendment forbidding discrimination in the drafting and training of servicemen. Though
frequently ignored, this clause represented a crucial step toward official condemnation of
racial discrimination in military life. Unlike in the previous war, black officers received
training at the same facilities and on an integrated basis with white officers. In addition,
the Navy, Marines, and Army Air Corp, all of which had previously either excluded black
Americans entirely or confined them to non-combat areas, accepted black Americans into
general service. In January of 1945 the War Department, acting in response to the
desperate need for infantrymen during the Battle of the Bulge, announced that a number
of Negro infantry platoons would be integrated into previously all white units and
shipped to fight on German soil. Though a temporary wartime measure, this
announcement provided black soldiers with an invaluable chance to prove themselves.^'
At the conclusion of the fighting, the War Department declared that the Negro platoons
had "established themselves as fighting men no less courageous than their white

^'Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 580-92; Gimnan (ed.), Negro Yearbook,
1941-1946, pp. 351-358, 361 & 368-372; Kluger, Simple Justice, p. 226; Meier and
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comrades."^"
Despite their many gains, black servicemen in World War II still faced
considerable discrimination. Though officially welcomed in integrated white training
schools, black Americans often found it difficult to get the necessary recommendations
from their commanding officers. In addition, though black Americans had gained the
right to serve in all branches of the United States' armed forces, their admission remained
on a segregated basis. Army command also deemed all black newspapers subversive and
banned their presence on army bases and facilities. The Red Cross' separation of blood
according to the race of the donor and recipient provided yet another example of official,
institutional racism. As in World War I, the presence of black servicemen continued to
generate hostility on the part of some white civilians. Hostile white civilians once again
harassed, beat, and sometimes even murdered black servicemen. The most galling
examples of discrimination came when Jim Crow eating and recreational facilities
continued to deny access to black soldiers, at the same time they provided such services
to German prisoners of war. This forever imprinted on the minds of many black
Americans that their nation favored white foreigners, even if they be the enemy, over its
own black citizens.^'
The improved status of black Americans during and after World War II resulted,

^"Quoted in Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 586.
^'Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 91-92;
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in part, from a new, more activist approach to achieving racial equality. During World
War I, black Americans, while never forgetting their own fight for equality, patiently
waited and remained optimistic that the end of the War would bring them their longawaited chance to improve their status in American society. Having failed to acquire the
full and equal benefits of American life, black Americans entered World War II with a far
more skeptical and impatient outlook. While still remaining loyal, the Negro press and
improvement agencies highlighted the continued existence of racism to a far greater
extent. Black Americans also vowed that this time aroimd they would not wait until the
end of the war to wage their fight for equality; They would begin immediately. This new
approach became crystallized in the Pittsburgh Courier's now famous "Double V"
editorial of February 14, 1942. This editorial declared that black Americans would
simultaneously fight for "victories over our enemies at home and victory over our
enemies on the battlefields abroad."^^ This increasingly vocal approach of the black
community made their demands for equality harder for America to ignore.^^
World War II created a favorable climate in which black Americans could press
their demands. Even more so than World War I, World War II was a total modem war.
Such a war necessitated the fiill participation and support of all American citizens.

^^Quoted in Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," p. 96.
^^Ralph N. Davis, "The Negro Newspapers and The War," Sociology and Social
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Guzman (ed.), Negro Yearbook, 1941-1946, pp. 386-87, and Lauren, Power and
Prejudice, p. 138.

28

Eleanor Roosevelt, a longtime advocate of civil rights, pointed out that "the nation cannot
expect colored people to feel that the United States is worth defending if the Negro
continues to be treated as he is now."^'* In addition, the horrific culmination of Hitler's
racism made it increasingly difficult to dismiss racism within the United States. The
clear irony of fighting to defeat the definitive example of racism overseas while
continuing to ignore racism at home became too obvious and disconcerting for many
Americans to ignore. This growing awareness of racism could also be found throughout
the international community. The growing power and visibility of the United States in
international affairs, combined with the heightened awareness of race, further
necessitated that America take steps to solve its racial problems. By failing to do so,
America left too many perfect propaganda opportunities by which its enemies could
attack its credibility as a moral leader.^^
While the rest of the world turned a critical eye toward the racial problems in the
United States, black Americans looked hopefully toward the newly emerging nations of
the Afro-Asian block. Black Americans had long felt a deep empathy with colored
people struggling to free themselves from white rule. This sense of identification with
colored people in other lands can be seen as early as World War I and Du Bois'

^''Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 140.
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organization of the first Pan-African conference. As World War II came to a close, Du
Bois once again set out to place racism in an international context. When the San
Francisco Conference met in 1945 to draft the United Nations' charter, Du Bois, acting in
conjunction with the NAACP and other black leaders and organizations, attempted to
persuade the American delegation to take a firm stand against imperialism. Du Bois also
tried unsuccessfiilly to introduce a proposal which forbid racial discrimination in any
member state.
An ever increasing number of black Americans adopted the pan-racial and anticolonial stance of Du Bois in the belief that their fate would always be inte^ined with
that of colored people everywhere. A. Philip Randolph declared his belief that "the
interest of the Negro people in America [was] the interest of Negroes all over the
world."^^ Walter White, Secretary of the NAACP, expressed similar sentiments when he
noted that the plight of black Americans was "part and parcel to the problems of other
colored peoples."^^ In the post-war years, nearly every major Negro improvement
organization placed the fight against colonialism onto their agenda. In addition, leading
national black newspapers, like the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier, began

^^James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and
the Cold War, \9A3>-\953)" African Historical Studies 4, no. 2 (1971): pp. 253-270;
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devoting increased attention and editorial space to anti-colonial struggles occurring
around the world.
Coinciding with their increased awareness of international affairs, black
Americans began increasingly to utilize crises occurring aroiind the world to highlight
both their ovra plight and that of colored peoples everywhere. In doing so, they began to
draw analogies of the sort they would later use so heavily in the Hungarian Crisis. When
Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, the mainstream newspapers vowed to
always "Remember Pearl Harbor." When an angry white mob lynched a black man in
Sikeston, Missouri on January 25,1942, the Chicago Defender declared that American
must "Remember Pearl Harbor...and Sikeston too!" and "Japan Lynched Pearl Harbor;
Sikeston Lynched Democracy.""" Similar use of international events can be seen in the
comparison George Schuyler, editor for the Pittsburgh Courier, drew between Nazism
and imperialism: "Negro countries have been overrun...and their peoples chained and
exploited like those of the European lands currently under Nazi rule.""' Roy Wilkins of
the NAACP even went as far as to compare the plight of Germany's Jewish population
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with the presence of black ghettos in America: "If it was cause for international weeping
that Jews were beaten in Berlin and scourged into a loathsome ghetto in Warsaw, what
about a tear for black ghettos in America.'"*^ In none of these and other similar statements
did black Americans really wish to imply that they felt no sympathy for the victims of
such tragedies. Rather, the purpose of these statements seems to have been to draw
attention to, and emphasize the seriousness of, the plight of black Americans.''^
The experience of black Americans in World War II would have repercussions far
beyond the immediate war years. For the most part, black Americans were able to hold
onto and build upon the economic opportunities secured in World War II. As with earlier
periods of urbanization, the black press and improvement organizations achieved
increased growth and influence. In 1940 the black press had a total circulation of
approximately 1,300,000. By 1945, circulation had skyrocketed to 1,809,000. World
War II also enabled the NAACP to broaden its influence. In 1941 it had a total
membership of around 50,00; By 1946 it had well over 400,000 members.'" The growing
power of the NAACP enabled it to gather increased financial support to launch a series of
court cases which, added to the legal precedents set in the 1930s, eventually dealt the

'•^Wilkins, "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in Logan (ed.). What the Negro
Wants, p. 115.
"•^See also Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 102 & 107 and Kluger, Simple Justice,
p. 25Franklin Frazier argues that this tremendous growth enabled the NAACP to
more accurately reflect the opinions and concerns of the mass of average Negroes than it
had at any time in its previous history.

final blow to legal segregation. The immediate post-war years also saw the return of
thousands of highly determined black veterans who, thanks to the G.I. Bill, had the
economic means to pursue higher education. This situation presented Jim Crow states
with two real options. Either they could build more facilities specifically intended for
blacks students, a very costly option, or they could desegregate existing white facilities.'"
The coming of the Cold War had both positive and negative implications for black
Americans' fight for equality. On one hand, the Cold War created an atmosphere where
any demand for change was seen as potentially "communist inspired." However, the
Cold War also provided black Americans with increased opportunities to highlight the
incongruity between the United States' claim of moral world leadership and the pervasive
presence of racism at home. It became very difficult for the United States to point
accusingly towards the Soviet Union's disregard for human rights when its treatment of
its own colored citizens remained so poor. The Soviet Union, of course, seized upon
every opportunity to exploit the America's racial problems for its own ends. It became
increasingly clear that the United States would have to take firm steps toward rectifying
these problems, or risk losing the respect of the international community, especially the
emerging Afro-Asian block. The Asian nation of Ceylon noted that racism and
discrimination in the United States provided "the greatest propaganda gift any country
could give the Kremlin in its persistent bid for the affections of the colored races of the

"^Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," pp. 99-100;
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world.""® Though other factors, notably the growing importance of black voters, played a
role as well, the Cold War strongly influenced both Harry S. Truman's and Dwight D.
Eisenhower's support of civil rights issues"^
The 1950s ushered in the height of the Cold War, the last gasps of imperialism,
and the beginnings of the modem Civil Rights Movement. These three forces would
profoundly affect one another and the way black Americans viewed their nation, the
world, and ultimately, the Himgarian Crisis. With the advent of the Civil Rights
Movement, and the watershed decision in Brown v. Board of Education, black Americans
began to take an renewed and increasing interest in the racial implications of both
America's domestic and foreign affairs. The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement in
America also coincided with the increasingly strident demands by the colored nations of
the Afro-Asian block to be free from colonial domination. Black Americans began
increasingly to identify their fight against Jim Crow at home with the Afro-Asian block's
fight against imperialism overseas. Black Americans looked on with pride as former
colonies throughout Asia and Africa threw off the final vestiges of colonialism and
emerged as full-fledged nations. When they saw examples of continued oppression,
black Americans protested loudly. Though black Americans wholly supported their
nation in the Cold War, they also pointed out that communism was not the only, or even
the worst, evil facing the world. For black Americans, the continuance of racism at home

"^Quoted in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 193.
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and imperialism overseas constituted a greater threat to international harmony than even
the Cold War/^
By the mid-1950s, black Americans had made many gains. Urbanization, war,
and the continued fight by organizations like the NAACP had brought them closer than
they had ever been to social, economic, and political equality. A limited, but ever
increasing, number of black Americans achieved prominent positions in the entertainment
industry, sports, business, and perhaps most important, political life. The United States
Congress now had three black Congressmen; Charles C. Diggs of Michigan, William L.
Dawson of Illinois, and Adam Clayton Powell of New York.^' Dwight D. Eisenhower
also appointed the first two black Americans to serve in executive positions in the
Executive Branch; J. Ernest Wilkins served as Assistant Secretary of Labor and E.
Frederic Morrow as Special White House Assistant. Black Americans also benefitted,
though not nearly to the extent as did the rest of America, from the booming economy of
the 1950s. Perhaps most important. Brown v. Board of Education had, after decades of
legal battles, at last stripped away the legal foimdation supporting Jim Crow segregation.
No other event imbued so many black Americans with a renewed sense of optimism for
the ftiture as this one Supreme Court decision.
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By 1956 when the first Hungarian refugees began to arrive, equality and full
citizenship for black Americans had became clearly visible, but still continued to remain
just beyond their grasp. While Brown v. Board of Education had monxmiental
consequences for the future, Jim Crow did not simply fall away in 1954. Instead, Brown
V.

Board ushered in a violent backlash, particularly in the South, against black

Americans' pursuit of integration and equality. Their nation's failure to guarantee them
equality and freedom from fear left many black Americans feeling frustrated and
betrayed. Black Americans had helped build their nation in the industrial era, fought in
two world wars, and remained loyal citizens in their nation's new Cold War. Yet still
their nation continued to deny them basic rights and privileges entitled to all American
citizens. The frustration of black Americans at their continued status as second-class
citizens, despite their many contributions, played an important role in the irritated and
often bitter reaction of black Americans to their nation's efforts to rescue Hungary's
refugees.

CHAPTER II: THE RESPONSE AND PARTICIPATION OF THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, MEDIA, AND PUBLIC IN THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956
AND 1957

The roots of the Hungarian Revolt lay in part at the Twentieth Conference of the
Soviet Union's Communist party, held in February 1956. As part of the new path toward
"destalinization" Nikita Khrushchev spoke of embarking upon an improved relationship
with Russia's Eastern European satellites. This relationship, he said, should be
characterized by increased cooperation and equality.^® When the word of this
liberalization leaked out, it stirred Russia's Eastern European satellites to demand greater
reforms and increased freedom over their own affairs. News of successful
demonstrations in Poland set off similar protests in Hungary, and by the Fall of 1956
Hungary was experiencing ever increasing daily unrest.^'
In an attempt to appease those demanding reforms, Emo Gero, First Secretary of
the Himgarian Corrmiunist Party, invited the popular, exiled ex-premier, Imre Nagy, to
return and share power. Even this invitation, however, failed to quiet the increasingly
aggressive demands for reform. In Budapest on October 23, 1956 demonstrations turned
into rioting, street fighting, and finally full scale revolt. Hungarian troops refused to fire
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on student protestors. Instead, they began to defect and join the rebellion against Soviet
occupation. The fighting soon spread from Budapest into the countryside. The rebels'
demands included the complete withdrawal of Russian occupational forces, free elections,
abolition of the hated secret police, greater religious freedom, and the end of forced
collectivization and industrialization.^^
In an effort to quiet the growing rebellion, Soviet leaders agreed to allow Nagy to
be frilly reinstated as Premier of Hungary. Nagy then reorganized the government and
won a promise from the Soviets to withdraw their troops. Despite that promise, however,
Soviet troops still remained on November 1, 1956. By this time, Russian troops were
rapidly approaching Budapest, and Nagy grew increasingly desperate. He proceeded to
declare Hungary a neutral nation, to announce its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and
to state his intention of turning toward the United Nations and the West for aid and
protection. As part of these efforts, Nagy urgently requested that the United Nations
demand that the Soviets abide by their earlier promise to withdraw their troops
peacefully. However, Nagy's efforts failed to halt the advance of Russian troops. On
November 4,1956 thousands of Soviet tanks and troops entered Budapest and put down

^^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 98,
pp. 263-264 and "Transcript of a Teletype Conversation Between the Legation in
Hungary and the Department of State, October 25, 1956," No. 108, pp. 271-286 (both in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990)[hereafter cited as Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe}-, Dwight D- Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging
Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 62-69;
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 295; and Radvanyi,
Hungary and the Superpowers, p. 7.
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the Hungarian Revolution with a brutality that shocked the world. The government of
Nagy fell and a Soviet backed government headed by Janos Kadar then took over.
Thousands of Hungarian rebels died in the days of brutal street fighting that followed. As
a result of the heavy bloodshed and fear of further Soviet reprisals, Hungarian refugees
began pouring into neighboring Austria by the thousands. Before the crisis came to an
end, well over one-hundred thousand refugees crossed into Austria.^^
The Eisenhower administration closely watched events in Himgary. They greeted
the news of the uprising with an uneasy mix of surprise, sympathy, excitement, and fear.
Eisenhower declared that "the heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary."^"
The rebellion, however, also inspired a sense of excitement. After all, it appeared to be
an ideal opportunity to validate Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' frequent rhetoric of
"liberation of captive peoples" and a "roll back of communism." Dulles conveyed a sense
of this sentiment when he declared: "We are on the point of winning an immense and

^^Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 254-255; United Nations, General Assembly,
Official Records of the General Assembly Second Emergency Special Session 4-10
November 1956, Plenary Meetings and Annex, p. 1 [UN Doc. A/3251]; United Nations,
Security Council, Security Council Official Records, Eleventh Year, Supplement for
October, November, and December 1956, pp. 11-120 [UN Doc. S/3726]; Ambrose,
Eisenhower, pp. 370-371; Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 81 & 87; George and
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 296-298; and Radvanyi, Hungary
and the Superpowers, pp. xv, 7-8, & 12-14.
^""Statement by the President," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 35, No.
906 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: 1956), p. 700. [hereafter cited as
DSBl
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long-hoped for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe.Eisenhower himself
displayed a similar attitude: "The United States considers the developments in Hungary
as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the
Himgarian people."®^ At a National Security Council Meeting, held on November 1,
1956, Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, best expressed this sense of
excitement when he declared that "what had occiuTed...was a miracle."^'

Fear of

provoking the Soviet Union into war, however, tempered the administration's excitement.
Though he too seemed to share the excitement of possibilities brought about by the
revolt, Eisenhower recognized that this was also a "dangerous moment." He expressed
concern that "with the deterioration of the Soviet Union's hold over its satellites might not
the Soviet Union be tempted to resort to extreme measure, even to start a world war?"^®
Eisenhower's concerns in this matter can be seen in his preparation for his October 31,
1956 address to the American people. Rather than giving the speech already prepared for
him by John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower completely revised Dulles' draft, considerably
toning down its references to "irresistible forces of liberation in Eastern Europe."^'

^'Quoted in Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 83.
^^"Statement by the President," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 906 (November 5, 1956), p.
700.
^'Memorandum, "Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security
Coimcil, November 1, 1956," p. 1, 302nd Meeting of NSC, Box 8, NSC Series, Papers of
Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library.
'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 67.
''Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the
Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 219-222 and "Developments in
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Almost from the very start of the crisis, the administration's statements indicated that
while America ultimately desired a free and independent Eastern Europe, they "could not,
or course, carry out this policy by resort to force.
The Eisenhower administration's decision to not use military force to save
Hungary resulted from a number of factors. The Suez Crisis played an important role in
this decision. On October 29, 1956 the joint forces of Israel, France, and Great Britain
attacked Egypt in attempt to stop Gamal Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Because of their role as America's primary allies in the Cold War, Britain and France
naturally expected the United States to support them. In addition, many officials in the
British government counted on the power of their longstanding personal friendships with
Eisenhower to exert a favorable influence on his administrations's response to their
actions in Suez. Israel, in turn, banked on the upcoming election and the power of the
Jewish vote to gain the Eisenhower administration's support or, at least, neutrality. The
administration, however, viewed this attack as a brutal, poorly planned, and blatantly
obvious throwback to the tactics that had characterized nineteenth century gimboat
diplomacy. While it troubled him to side against old friends and allies, Eisenhower
concluded that Britain, France, and Israel had obviously acted as the aggressors. He

Eastern Europe and the Middle East," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), pp.
743-745.
^°"Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. October 31,1956," Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1958), p. 1061. [hereafter cited as Public Papers of DDE, 1956]
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further believed that their actions constituted a clear violation of the 1950 Tri-Partite
Declaration, and thus obligated him oppose the invasion.®' In a speech to the American
people Eisenhov^er declared that; "We value...the bonds with those great nations, those
great friends, with whom we now so plainly disagree...But this we know above all: there
are...firm principles...and we shall not break ours."®^ To register his administration's
disapproval internationally, Eisenhower sent Dulles directly to the UN with a cease fire
resolution for the Middle East. This action made American opposition explicitly known
to the world and, needless to say, infuriated America's allies. By diverting the United
States' attention from Hungary, dividing the Western world, and wholly occupying
Britain and France, Suez effectively eliminated any possibility of united Western military
action on behalf of Himgary.®^
The Suez Crisis also served to diminish the adverse impact that Soviet aggression

®'This declaration, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
in 1950 promised to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. In it these three nations
agreed to ensure that arms shipments to Arabs and Israelis remained balanced, and kept at
a minimum. They also agreed to initiate joint action against the aggressor should the
peace between Egypt and Israel ever be violated.
Address in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. November 1 1956,"
Public Papers of DDE, 1956,-p. 1072
^^Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 378-393 & 430-431; Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), pp. 98-91; "Address
in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. November 1 1956," Public Papers of
DDE, 1956, p. 1072; Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 350-366; Adams, Firsthand Report, pp.
255-270; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 298 & 304;
Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 64-89; and Radvanyi, Hungary and the
Superpowers, pp. 10-11.

had on world opinion. This element can particularly be seen with regards to the reaction
of the nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The Eisenhower administration
repeatedly sought to enlist the aid of the Afro-Asian block in America's efforts to
mobilize world opinion against the Soviets. For these nations, however, the situation in
Hungary, while perhaps unfortunate, paled in comparative importance to British, French,
and Israeli aggression against Egypt. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, pointed
out that Nasser's defiance of Western imperialism "has powerfully moved the countries of
Asia and Africa."^ Eisenhower, however, regarded Nehru's concern for oppressed
peoples as too narrowly focused. He suggested that "Nehru thinks of only one thing,
which is colonialism, by which he [Nehru] means the white over colored people."®'
Eisenhower and his administration did recognize that, for many of the nations of the
developing world, the action taken by Britain, France, and Israel dredged up impleasant
memories of past imperialism. The administration, however, sought to convince Nehru
and others like him that the Soviets practiced "a type of colonialism that was far more
serious and cruel than that practiced in the past by some of the Western nations - the latter
a dying practice."®^ As a whole, the nations of Africa and the Near and Middle East,
while appreciating America's strong stance on the Suez Crisis, remained largely

^''Quoted in Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 108.
^'"Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington,
November 5, 1956, 10:20 a.m.," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 168, p.
394.
^^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 112.
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unconvinced that their interests lay with active opposition to the Soviets on the Hungarian
issue.
In light of his administration's general failure to gain more active support from the
Afro-Asian block in the Hungarian Crisis, Eisenhower expressed his frustration that these
nations were "not far more alarmed by the forceful domination of Eastern Europe by
Russia than...the few vestiges of Western colonialism."®^ The administration also, at
times, discussed whether the nations of the Near and Middle East may have made a deal
with the Soviets in order to gain stronger support on the Suez issue.®^ The nations of the
East understandably, however, viewed the international situation in light of their interests
and from their own xmique historical experience. Many of these nations had only recently
gained their independence and emerged from a long and unhappy experience with
Western imperialism. As a result, their sympathies were with Egypt, and their fears of
Western colonialism remained paramount. The Eisenhower administration readily came
to conviction that the imtimely nature of Suez had cost the West a priceless moral and

"Ibid.
®*This alleged "deal" refers to the choice of many Asian nations to abstain from
voting on UN resolutions which condenmed the Soviet Union and called for immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Himgary. When the United Nation's General Assembly
approved America's resolution of November 4, 1957, the Asian nations of Ceylon, India,
Burma, and Indonesia attempted to present amendments which moderated the
condemnatory nature of this resolution. When this attempt failed, these nations
introduced their own resolution. This resolution, while far more moderate than that of the
United States, did agree on some basic measures. One of the most significant areas of
agreement was Asia's inclusion of a call for the presence of United Nations observers in
Hungary. (See United Nations documents: A/3286, A/3319, A/3325, and A/3437).
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public relations victory in the Cold War,®' At a National Security Council meeting of
November 8, 1956 the participants pointed to this lost opportunity: "If the British and
French had stayed out of Egypt...they [the Soviets] would have been ruined in the eyes of
world public opinion."^"
There still remained the possibility that the United States could act alone in
providing conventional military support or an air lift of supplies to the Hungarian rebels.
However, geography argued against this option. The only way to reach Himgary was
through or over surrounding communist nations or neutral Austria. To cross into
communist nations meant facing the almost certain possibility of war. To cross into or
over Austria meant violating neutrality laws and placing Austria at risk of physical

^'Telegram #1176, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru, November 5,
1956 and Telegram #1242, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru, November 11,
1956 (both in India's Prime Minister Nehru 1956 (2), Box 29, International Series, Papers
of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library;
"Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington,
November 5,1956,10:20 a.m.," No. 168, pp. 394-395, "Telegram from the Department
of State to the Mission at the United Nations," No. 172, pp. 404-405; "Memorandum of
Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,
November 8, 1956, 9-11:25 a.m.," No. 175, pp. 419-420; "Editorial Note," No. 180, p.
428; "Notes on the 46th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related
Problems, Washington, November 13, 1956," No. 185, pp. 439-440; "Editorial Note,"
No. 193, pp. 460-462; and "Notes on the 56th Meeting of the Special Committee on
Soviet and Related Problems, December 11, 1956," No. 207, p. 503 (all in Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 107-108 &
112; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 431.
'""Memorandum of Discussion at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security
Council," Washington, November 8, 1956, 9-11:25 a.m." Foreign Relations, Eastern
Europe, Vol. 25, No. 175, pp. 419-420.
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destruction if conflict should erupt^' Therefore, as Eisenhower concluded, Hungary
remained "as inaccessible to us as Tibet."^^
The United States' vast arsenal of nuclear weapons provided the Eisenhower
administration with another possible option. Nuclear threats had worked in ending the
Korean War; America still maintained a clear nuclear superiority; and the Russians well
knew of this superiority. However, the fear of a world wdde nuclear war and
Eisenhower's fervent belief that the Soviets would not back down precluded this option.
Eisenhower recognized that the Soviets had much more at stake than the United States on
the Himgarian issue. Eisenhower surmised that the survival of the Soviet Union
depended upon their meiintaining dominance over Eastern Europe. Based on this belief,
Eisenhower concluded that the Soviets would do anything, even use nuclear weapons, to
protect their hegemony in Eastern Europe. He believed that the Soviets would perceive
any American conventional military operations or nuclear threats on behalf of Hungary as
a deliberate attempt to secure allies in Eastern Europe and destroy the Warsaw Pact." As

^'Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 355 & 367; Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 8889 & 95; George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 303-304;
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 430; and Richardson, Presidency of Eisenhower,
pp. 99.
'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 95.
'^Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States
Foreign Policy From Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),
pp. 111-114; Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster
Dulles' Command of American Power (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960),
180-181; "The Task of Waging Peace," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 906 (November 5, 1956), p.
697; "Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, p. 744 and "The Hungarian
Question in the Security Council," p. 758 (both in DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907, November 12,
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a result, the Eisenhower administration took every occasion "to remove any false fears
that we...look upon...Eastern European countries as potential military allies."^'' In their
final assessment, the Eisenhower administration concluded that any intervention "would
risk a nuclear war with the Russians, and the American government was not prepared to
take this risk on the Hungarian issue.
While the decision to not risk war over the Hungarian Crisis was probably a wise
decision, the question of American complicity in fostering the rebellion and then
abandoning its fighters dogged the Eisenhower administration. Critics pointed to the
activities and pronouncements of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Voice of
America, and in particular, Radio Free Europe. The Soviet Union and its Eastern
European satellites, not surprisingly, focused on America's alleged initial actions in
instigating the rebellion. These governments accused the United States of maliciously
interfering in the domestic affairs of Hungary. They asserted that for years the American

1956); "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. October 31,1956," p. 1062 and "Address in
Convention Hall, Philadelphia Pennsylvania. November 1, 1956," p. 1071 (both in Public
Papers of DDE, 1956); Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 367; Eisenhower, White House Years,
pp. 67-68; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 304-306;
Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers, 11-12; and Richardson, Presidency of
Eisenhower, pp. 99-100 and 71.
'''"Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907
(November 12, 1956), p. 744.
'^Quoted in Brown, Faces of Power, p. 113.
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Congress had appropriated funds for the express purpose of fomenting rebellion.^® The
Soviet block further maintained that the United States, not the Soviet Union, bore sole
responsibility for the disorder and bloodshed in Himgary. The Soviet block also argued
that the United States still continued to employ its "low and criminal propaganda
designed to obstruct the restoration of normal life in Hungary at all costs."^^
While the Soviet Union's condemnation of the United States could be dismissed
as deceptive rhetoric designed to detract world opinion from their own brutal aggression,
other international sources also criticized America's role in the Hungarian Crisis. The
United Nations, Austrians, Germans, and the Hvmgarian rebels themselves all expressed
their conviction that the United States bore some responsibility for the tragedy occurring
in Hungary. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, which always focused on the Eisenhower
administration's actions and their role in instigating the rebellion, these voices of reproach
focused their criticism on the Eisenhower administration's inaction after the rebellion had
begim. They were not upset so much with America's alleged encouragement of rebellion,
as with its later failure to intervene more assertively on behalf of Hungary's freedom
fighters. International critics saw America's failure to provide more material assistance as

^^These charges refer to the 1951 Kersten Amendment to the National Security
Act. This amendment allowed the United States Congress to appropriate fimds for what
the Soviets referred to as "espionage and diversionist activity." These activities included
the recruiting and training of dissident groups throughout Eastern Europe as well as
propaganda efforts like Voice of American and Radio Free Europe.
^^See United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records of the General
Assembly Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol 2., Verbatim Records of Meetings 12
November 1956-8 March 1957, pp. 693-697 [UN Doc. A/PV.620].
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an outright abandonment of the promises implied in both the Eisenhower administration's
repeated declarations of "liberation" and its propaganda activities in Eastern Europe.'^
In response to their perception that America had somehow failed Hungary, these
critics expressed emotions ranging from disgust, to bitterness, to disillusionment. Henry
Cabot Lodge, American representative to the United Nations, repeatedly expressed
concern over the feeling among some members of the UN that the United States had
"been exciting the Hvmgarians...and now that they are in trouble, we turn our backs on
them."'® Austria, which by virtue of geography, bore the brunt of caring for the refugees,
also complained to American diplomats that the United States had "incited the
Himgarians to action" and then failed to "do anything effective."*" Among the rebels
themselves there were who charged that "the US for the attainment of its own selfish

''^"Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State," No. 129, p.
319; "Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the President, November 9,1956,"
No. 178, pp. 424-425, "Notes on the 46th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet
and Related Problems, Washington, November 13,1956," No. 185, pp. 436-438;
"Editorial Note," No. 180, p. 460; "Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the
Department of State," No. 198, pp. 472-473; "Telegram From the Department of State to
the Embassy in Austria," No. 202, pp. 481-482; "Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the
Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, November 30,1956,"
No. 204, pp. 494-495, and "Editorial Note," No. 228, pp. 556-558 (all in Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 371-372; George &
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 300; and Richardson, Presidency of
Eisenhower, p. 99
^'"Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the President, November 9,
1956, Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 178, p. 424
®°"Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State," Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 129, p. 319.
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goals, had cynically and cold-bloodedly maneuvered the Hungarian people into action"^'
However, according to the American Legation, most Hungarians felt disappointed rather
than bitter, and generally expressed their belief that "since we [the United States] were
fostering liberty we would help the revolt."®^
Domestic opinion, as measured through statements of American diplomats, press,
and Congressmen conveyed a sense of embarrassment and recognition that international
criticism held some validity. Members of the American Legation in Budapest, who
witnessed the situation first-hand, repeatedly communicated back to the State Department
regarding what they saw as inappropriate conduct on the part of Radio Free Europe.
Though the Legation never pinpointed specific broadcasts or statements, or actually
accused the Eisenhower administration of intentionally fomenting revolution, the
Legation repeatedly stated their belief that Radio Free Europe did, even if inadvertently,
give the wrong impression to the rebels. The Legation argued that in light of the events
in Himgary, the United States needed to reassess how other nations might interpret its
propaganda.®^ Members of the American Legation pointed out that "our past radio

^'"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 198, p. 472.
®^"Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related
Problems, Washington, November 30,1956," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol.
25, No. 204, p. 495.
®^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 198,
pp. 472-73; "Notes on the 53rd Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related
Problems, Washington, November 30, 1956," No. 204, pp. 494-495; and "Despatch From
the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," No. 214, pp. 520-522 (all in
Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe Vol. 25).
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propaganda is at present [a] source of much embarrassment to us."^"*
The American Congress and press, while not having the same intimate knowledge
of the situation as the Legation, expressed similar criticism of what they perceived to be
their government's abandonment of promises, implied or otherwise, to help the
Hungarians. On March 13, 1957 reporters questioned Dulles as to why his administration
"did not give military aid to Hungary when she appealed to the United States to protect
her from Russia."®' In his memoirs Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State,
reported on having to deal with a "stream of anxious visitors" some of whom were
"accusing the State Department of having actively fomented the Hungarian Rebellion."^®
While most domestic criticism may not have gone this far, there was a clear sense in the
American Congress and media that the United States bore some responsibility for the
tragic turn of events in Hungary.®' For example, John O' Kearney of The Nation argued

*^"Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State," Foreign
Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 198, p. 472.
^'"Secretary Dulles' News Conference Canberra, March 13," DSB, Vol 36, No.
927 (April 1, 1957), p. 533.
®®Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 429.
^^Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, First
Session, Vol. 103, Parts 1-12 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp.
325-326, 750-751 & 771-772 & 9763-9764 [hereafter cited as Congressional Record]-,
Congressional Record Appendix, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, First
Session, pp. A287-A288 & A482-A483, A4524 & A5136 [hereafter cited as
Congressional Record Appendix]-, Mark Gayn, "10 Days That Shook the World: The
Counter-Revolution," The Nation, 10 November 1956, pp. 379-382; John O' Kearney,
"Hungary: Myth and Reality," The Nation, 2 February 1957, pp. 91-94; Walter Ridder,
"Our Propaganda in Hungary," The Ne-w Republic, 17 December 1956, pp. 12-13; "Day
of Atonement," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 2; Edmond Taylor, "The Lessons of
Hungary," The Reporter, 27 December 1957, pp. 17-21; "Five Free Days," Time, 10

that, while Radio Free Europe may not have actually incited the revolt, it "played a large
part in keeping blood flowing.Senator

Richard L. Neuberger, a Democrat from

Oregon, similarly argued that "our phrasemakers must assume a share of the
responsibility for the terrible bloodshed and tragedies."^'
The Eisenhower administration always maintained that the rebellion was a
"spontaneous uprising," and that America played little or no role in its instigation. With
regards to the official government activities of Voice of America and the CIA,
Eisenhower asserted that, while of course America wanted to see freedom come to
Eastern Europe, "the United States doesn't now, and never has advocated open rebellion
by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail.
With regards to the unofficial activities of Radio Free Europe, the Eisenhower
administration argued that the administration only provided guidelines and could not be
held responsible the content of all broadcasts. However, they also stated that they
believed that, while Radio Free Europe may have slightly exceeded its boimdaries, it
generally remained within the established guidelines. The Eisenhower administration
consistently maintained that the Hungarians acted of their own accord, and that America

December 1956, p. 6; and "Himgary: Doing it Themselves," Time, 17 December 1956, p.
26.
Kearney, "Hungary: Myth and Reality," p. 4
^'^Congressional Record, p. 771.
'°"The President's News Conference of November 14, 1956," Public Papers of
DDE, 1956,^. 1096.
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could, at the very most, be found guilty only of keeping alive the idea of freedom."
The message that freedom exists and what it
means has been carried in broadcasts from
the free world to captive peoples, who
otherwise would hear only what their police
state masters want them to hear. The very
fact that freedom exists anywhere will, of
course, encourage those who are deprived of
it to strive for their own liberty and
independence.'^
Whether or not they played a part in instigating the rebellion, the Eisenhower
administration had to deal with the Hungarian Crisis in light of the hard realities of a
tense international situation, an inaccessible geographic location, and the Soviet's high
motivation to preserve their empire. In the final assessment, the use of force brought with
it too many risks. Faced with such risks, the United States had few options to halt the
bloodshed. The only remaining possibilities lay with verbal condemnation and providing
aid and comfort to the Hungarian victims of Soviet aggression. Eisenhower recalled in
his memoirs that "the United States did the only thing it could... readied [itself]...to help

""Secretary Dulles' News Conference Canberra, March 13," DSB, Vol. 36, No.
927 (April 1,1957), p. 533; "Memorandum of Telephone Conversations With the
President, November 9, 1956," No. 178, pp. 424-425; "Editorial Note," No. 193, p. 460;
"Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency
(Washburn) to the President," No. 197, pp. 470-471; "Memorandum From the Director of
Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the President," No. 199, pp. 473-475; and "Memorandum
From the Acting Secretary of State to the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)," No. 213,
pp. 518-519 (all in Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25); "The President's News
Conference of November 14,1956," Public Papers of DDE 1956, p. 1096; Ambrose,
Eisenhower, 371-372; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 429.
'^"Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President's Press
Secretary (Hagerty)," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol. 25, No. 213, p. 519.
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the refugees fleeing from the...Soviets, and did everything possible to condemn the
aggression.'"^
The administration's earliest efforts came through the United Nations and
personal diplomacy. On November 3, 1956 Henry Cabot Lodge, American ambassador
to the UN, introduced a resolution calling on the Soviets "to desist...from any form of
intervention, particularly armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary."^''
However, the Soviets, quite predictably, vetoed this resolution on November 4, 1956. At
this point, the United Nations, again at the urging of Lodge, decided that the situation
warranted calling an emergency session of the General Assembly. At this emergency
session. Lodge introduced another resolution calling on the Soviets to end their military
intervention. This resolution further called upon the Soviet Union to permit the entry of
UN observers and humanitarian supplies into Hungary. This resolution passed by a vote
of 53-9 with 13 abstentions. However, with the exception of allowing some food and
medical supplies to enter Hungary, the Soviets simply ignored this and other similar
resolutions.®^
While Lodge worked in the UN to bring world attention to the plight of Hungary,

'^Eisenhower, White House Years, p. 89.
'^"Text of U.S. Draft Resolution Vetoed By U.S.S.R on November 4," DSB, Vol.
35, No. 907 (November 12, 1956), p. 763.
'^"The Hungarian Question in the Security Council," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907
(November 12, 1956), pp. 757-763; "The Hungarian Question Before the General
Assembly," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 908 (November 19, 1956), pp. 800-807; Eisenhower,
White House Years, p. 89; and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 431.
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Eisenhower attempted to influence the Soviet Union through personal diplomacy. On
November 4, 1956 Eisenhower wrote to Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers. In this letter, Eisenhower reminded Bulganin of the "Declaration of
the Soviet Government of October 30, 1956." In this declaration, the Soviets argued that
their policy had always been one of "respect of territorial integrity, state independence
and sovereignty, and noninterference in...another's domestic affairs." This declaration
went on to admit that "the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary [could] serve
as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation."'^ Eisenhower then pointed out
that this declaration "was generally understood as promising the early withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Hungary.The Soviets, however, coldly informed Eisenhower that
the situation in Hungary did not concern him, and that the "problem of the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Himgary...[came] completely and entirely under the competence of the
Himgarian and Soviet governments."'®
Faced with a situation in which moral suasion had failed miserably and the use of
force posed unacceptable risks, the Eisenhower administration could do little more than
offer America's tremendous resources to aid the thousands of Hungarian refugees fleeing

'^"Text of Soviet Statement of October 30," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 907 (November
12, 1956), pp. 745-746.
'^"Message to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.,
Urging Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Hungary. November 5, 1956," Public Papers
of DDE. 795(5, p. 1080.
'^"Message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R
(Bulganin) to the President, November 7, 1956," in Paul E. Zinner (ed.). Documents of
American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 260.
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into neighboring Austria. On November 8, 1956 the Eisenhower administration set in
motion the necessary mechanisms for the emergency processing of 5,000 Hungarian visa
applications under the Refugee Relief Act. Within two weeks, the Defense Department
had transported the first group of refugees to the United States.®' Upon their arrival,
Eisenhower himself welcomed them to America and expressed his administration's
commitment to continue to provide assistance: "I want to tell you that our covmtry feels
privileged in inviting you to the United States...We shall continue our efforts to...help
those who are coming..and...be very, very glad to do so."'°°
By the end of November, the Eisenhower administration would be faced with the
opportunity to make good on its promise to help the refugees. It soon became clear that
America's initial offer of asylum would not sufficiently reduce the massive numbers of
refugees fleeing daily into Austria. The administration then took further steps to alleviate
the crisis. On December 1, 1956 it announced that the U.S. would accept an additional
15,000 refiigees imder the parolee provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Under the parolee provision, refugees could be admitted only on a temporary basis.
However, Eisenhower promised that in January he would go to Congress and seek

^'Memorandum, Max Rabb to Governor Adams, November 8, 1956;
Memorandum, Harry B. Lyford to James Hagerty, November 19, 1956; and "Remarks By
the President to a Group of Hungarian Refugees in His Office at 9:00 A.M. November 26,
1956," (all in Official File 154-N-2, Box 823, Papers as Dwight D. Eisenhower as
President, White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library); "Need for Nationwide Effort
to Admit Hungarian Refugees," DSB, Vol. 35, No. 908 (November 19, 1956), pp. 807808; and Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 257-258.
'"""Remarks By the President to a Group of Hungarian Refugees in His Office at
9:00 A.M. November 26, 1956."
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legislation to change the refugees' status to permanent residents. He further announced
that when these numbers had been exhausted he would continue to reassess the situation
and find new ways to meet the need."" These actions, he maintained, would "give
practical effect to the American people's intense desire to help the victims of Soviet
oppression.'""^
The Hungarian refugee relief effort continued to pick up speed as 1956 drew to a
close. On December 12,1956 Eisenhower sent his Vice-President, Richard Nixon, to
Austria. He also appointed Tracy Voorhees to head the "President's Committee for
Hungarian Relief." This committee served to provide coordination and support for the
various volunteer and govenmient agencies involved in refugee relief work. It also
served as a clearing house for the tremendous flow of public offers of employment,
housing, and education that poured in daily to the government's refugee relocation center
at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. When Nixon returned from Austria, he submitted his
"Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees." In this report, Nixon urged the
President to be open and flexible when it came to Hungarian inmiigration. On the basis

'°'U.S. Department of State to Embassy in Vienna, November 28,1956, Official
File 154-N-3, Box 824, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, White House
Central Files, Eisenhower Library; "More Himgarian Refugees Offered Asylum in U.S.,"
DSB, Vol. 35, No. 911 (December 10,1956), p. 913; "White House Statement
Concerning the Admission of Additional Hungarian Refugees. December 1, 1956,"
Public Papers of DDE, 1956, pp. 1116-1118; Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 257-258,
Ambrose, p. 371; Eisenhower, White House Years, pp. 97-98; and Murphy, Diplomat
Among Warriors, p. 431.
io2"White House Statement Concerning the Admission of Additional Hungarian
Refugees. December 1, 1956," Public Papers of DDE, 1956, p. 1118.
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of this recommendation, Eisenhower went to Congress and requested that revisions be
made to the Iirmiigration and NationaUty Act to allow for the entry of an increased
number of refiigees. He also made good on his earlier promise to request that Congress
change the status of the Hungarian refugees from "parolees" to permanent residents. By
the end of the 1957, over 32,000 Hungarians had been successfully resettled in the United
States.'"^
Throughout the Hxmgarian Revolt and the ensuing refugee relief program, the
majority of American opinion was characterized by enormous sympathy for the
Hungarians and an intense desire to help in any way possible.'"^ Soviet brutality in
putting down the Revolt shocked and horrified most Americans. For many Americans,
this initial response would be followed by impatience with what they perceived as their
government's failure to take more forcefial steps to halt Soviet aggression. Most
domestic critics recognized that a legitimate fear of war motivated the Eisenhower
administration's cautious approach. However, these same critics also believed that

'"^"Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees," and Letter, Gerald Morgan to
Tracy S. Voorhees, January 28,1957 (both in Official File 154-N-2, Box 823, White
House Central Files, Eisenhower Library); "Developments Relating to Hungarian Relief
Activities," DSB, Vol. 35, Nos. 913-914 (December 24 and 31, 1956), pp. 979-980; and
"Recommended Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act," DSB, Vol. 36, No. 921
(February 18, 1957), pp. 247-250.
'"•'There were, however, a minority of individuals and groups who opposed the
admission of the Hungarian refugees. The grounds upon which they voiced their
opposition encompassed diverse concems. Some felt that the refugees would have an
adverse effect on the economy. Some Protestants felt that there were too many refugees
of both the Catholic and Jewish faiths. Other voices expressed concern that there might
be communist infiltrators and spies among the incoming refugees.
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American had missed an important and historical opportunity to implement liberation and
turn the tide toward victory in the Cold War. A House Subcommittee referred to the
Hungarian uprising as "the lost opportunity of our generation.'""^ A November 1956
editorial in The Reporter, sent in by a reader from New Jersey, argued that peace at any
price did not always provide the best policy option. This editorial went on to declare that
the United States needed to "decide between freedom and slavery.'""® Similar criticism
appeared in an editorial found in the Saturday Evening Post on January 1957. In
discussing the risk of war as a consideration, this editorial accused America of putting
"its fears before its principles.'""^ These and other voices throughout the Congress and
press argued that, despite the risk or war, morality and world opinion necessitated that the
Eisenhower administration take additional steps above and beyond UN resolutions,
condemnatory statements, and refrigee relief'"*
A surprising number of American critics advocated the immediate deployment of
the United States' military forces. Others argued that, if open military intervention

Congressional Record, p. 14637.

io6«a Troubled Conscience," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 5.
'"'"Let's Not Help Any Red Despot Get Off the Hook!" Saturday Evening Post,
26 January 1957, p. 10.
^^^Congressional Record Appendix, pp. A287-A288 & A794-A796;
Congressional Record, pp. 51-52, 308-320, 3861-3862, 5182-5183; & 14637-14638;
Max Ascoli, "The Price of Peacemongering," The Reporter, 29 November 1956, p. 10;
"Hungary: The Five Days of Freedom," Time, 12 November 1956, pp. 40-48; "Revolt in
Hungary," Time, 26 November 1956, p. 8; "A Troubled Conscience," pp. 5-6, "Hungary:
Doing it Themselves, p. 26; "Let's Not Help Any Red Despot Get Off the Hook!" p. 10;
and Taylor, "The Lessons of Hungary," pp. 17-21.
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remained unfeasible, then the Eisenhower administration should perhaps consider
providing some form of covert military assistance to Hungary's freedom fighters. When
it became clear that the United States government had no intention of providing any
military support, a number of private organizations and individuals sought to raise a
volunteer army, composed of American citizens, to aid Hungary's rebellion. Most
Americans, however, while not entirely ruling out the use of force, instead, proposed
varying combinations of tough economic sanctions, withdrawal of diplomatic
recognition, and the immediate expulsion of the Soviet Union and the Kadar government
from the United Nations. Whatever particular solution they advocated, domestic critics
all expressed a sense of anger or, at the least, disappointment, that their government had
been either unable, or unwilling, to save Hungary.'"' This sense of disillusionment can be
seen in an editorial in the Saturday Evening Post of February 1957. This editorial,
written by a private citizen from Ohio, argued that from here forward the Himgarian
Revolution would "stand as a monument to the eternal shame of those evasive
elements..who would not, or said they could not, come to the aid of a sacrificing
populace."""

''''^Congressional Record, pp. 307-320, 325-326, 316, 318-319, 325-326; 750-751,
771-772, 2096, 3655, 3861-3862, 5182-5183,10108-10110 & 14637-14640; Christopher
Emmet (Chairman of the Friends of Captive Nations), "Action to Save Hungary,"
America, 17 November 1956, p. 185; "Still Time to Help Hungary," Life, 24 June 1957,
p. 36; Harold H. Martin, "The Man Who Wanted To Help Hungary," Saturday Evening
Post, 29 December 1956, pp. 19 & 53; "Hungary's Revolt," Saturday Evening Post, 16
February 1957, p. 5, and "Volunteers," Time, 31 December 1956, p. 2.
"""Hungary's Revolt," p. 5.

The Eisenhower administration's announcement of its Hungarian Refugee Relief
Program provided a partial outlet for Americans' frustrated desire to actively aid the
Hungarian victims of Soviet aggression. By the end of 1956, refugee relief efforts, both
official and unofficial, had sprung up around the nation. Churches and charity
organizations began massive fund raising drives; Colleges and universities set up
scholarship programs; businesses rushed to provide employment; and the media began
presenting highly dramatized and sympathetic portrayals of the Hungarians' plight.'"
The American public's strong display of support for the Hungarian refugees can further
be seen in the generous outpouring of food, clothing, shelter, and cash donations that
arrived daily at Camp Kilmer. The Eisenhower administration clearly recognized the link
between the public's earlier criticism and the overwhelmingly positive response toward
refugee relief efforts. Discussion at a meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and
Related Problems, held on December 19, 1956, noted that; "The realization of our
impotence to act in Hungary had a sobering effect on public opinion." Those at this
meeting went on to acknowledge "that the refugee matter was more and more becoming
an American operation as a result of public criticism that too little was being done.""^

"'The highly sympathetic response of the mainstream media can be seen in
Time's selection of the anonymous "Hungarian Freedom Fighter" as its 1957 "Man of the
Year." Prior to this selection, a number of Time readers wrote in with various
suggestions such as: "Hungarians..who have defied Soviet tyranny." (19 November 1956,
p. 8); "Imre Nagy;" and "The unknown Hungarian youth...who showed us that a freedomloving heart is mightier than a tank" (both in 3 December 1956, p. 4).
"^"Notes of the 58th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related
Problems, Washington, December, 19, 1956," Foreign Relations, Eastern Europe, Vol.
25, No. 216, p. 533.
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The extraordinary popularity of the refugee relief effort, combined with the
widespread feeling that more should have been done, made ending the Hungarian
Refugee Relief Program very difficult. In the Spring of 1957, the Eisenhower
administration annoimced that the time had come to taper off refugee admissions and aid.
This announcement set off a new wave of public criticism. The Washington Post referred
to the administration's new policy as "cruel and capricious.""^ America, referring to the
Eisenhower administration's earlier decision to not use force, declared that now this new
policy could not be explained away by "pleading the risk of war or the exigencies of
international politics.""" Critics in both Congress and the press accused the Eisenhower
administration of once again abandoning Himgary."^ In a special article to the New York
Times, Senator John MacCormac of Massachusetts argued that the decision to phase out
refugee relief, combined with earlier misleading propaganda, left the Htmgarians with a
bitter feeling that "they are being let down again.""^ MacCormac and other critics
pointed to the some 40,000 refugees still in Austria and argued that more needed to be
done. Critics argued that still divided families, the continued burden on Austria, and the
need to restore and maintain respect in the eyes of the world demanded that America not
leave its good work vmfmished. Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey expressed the

^^^Washington Post, 8 April 1957, p. 5.
"""Liberty in Mourning," y4mencat, 27 April 1957, pp. 10-11.
"^It should, however, that some of the critics in the press placed equal blame on
the United States Congress for America's failure to adequately address the refugee issue.
York Times, 19 April 1957, p. 8. [hereafter cited as NYT\
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feelings of many Americans that their nation had stopped just short of fulfilling its
obligation to the Hungarians."^
This is a matter not only of fairness...but
also a matter of the appearance this country
gives, depending upon whether or not it
fulfills its moral obligations...in this regard.
It is very important that we not stop now,
before the job is done."®
The Hungarian Revolt touched the vast majority of Americans like few other
events in history. Rather than urging their government to concentrate on domestic affairs
and stay out of a potentially threatening situation overseas, as is so often the case, many
Americans pressed for greater involvement than their government was either willing or
able to provide. The Eisenhower administration, imdoubtedly, felt sympathy for the
Himgarian rebels and wanted to assist in their struggle to liberate themselves from Soviet
domination. However, the threat of all-out war in a nuclear age could not be ignored.
For the Eisenhower administration, the fear of war precluded any military assistance.
The administration, instead, sought to use the United Nations and personal diplomacy to
persuade the Soviet Union to halt its aggressive action. Unable to satisfy the domestic
pressures for stronger American action, the administration took the imprecedented step of
inviting and transporting thousands of Hungarians to America's shores. However, for

' ^^Congressional Record Appendix, pp. A5480-A5481; Congressional Record pp.
5223-5224; 6114-6117, 9763-9765; 10302 & 10520; Hungary - Lest We Forget!" Life, 29
April 1957, p. 42; New York Post, 1 April 1957, p. 4; NYT, 6 April 1957, p. 1 & 6, April
7, 1957, p. 1 & 30, April 11, 1957, p. 12, and April 19, 1957, p. 8; and Washington Post,
8 April 1957, p. 5^^^CongressionalRecord, p. 6115.

many Americans, even this action did not fully satisfy what they saw as America's
obligation to the people of Hungary. Many individuals and groups in the American
Congress, the media, and the general public argued that until every Hungarian refugee
had been rescued and suitably placed, America had not ftilfilled its responsibility for the
Hungarian Crisis.

CHAPTER III: THE REACTION OF BLACK AMERICANS TO THE
HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956 AND 1957

While Eisenhower Administration sought to provide what relief it could and most
Americans either encouraged these efforts or demanded that more be done for the
Hungarians, black Americans viewed the Hungarian crisis from a very different
perspective. Like most Americans, black Americans recognized that the Soviet Union
had acted with immense brutality and total lack of concern for human rights. Black
Americans, however, also pointed out that Hungary was not the first or only example of a
larger, more powerful nation seeking to control and exploit a weaker power. At the same
time America poured forth its sympathy for Hungary, black Americans called attention to
both past and contemporary examples of aggression against the peoples of Asia and
Africa, and these peoples' struggles to gain their freedom. Black Americans also pointed
to their own fight for equality, and the indifference and violent resistance it so often
encountered. Rightly or wrongly, many black Americans concluded that their nation
simply did not care imless the victims of oppression happened to be white. James L.
Hicks of the Amsterdam News observed that:
We Americans...sit back and watch black
[emphasis added] people from Ethiopia to
Mississippi get their brains beat out by
anyone who has guns to do the job without
getting 'charitable' or excited. But the
minute someone starts kicking a white
nation around we rush to their aid by land,
sea and air.""^

Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17.
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Because of its closeness in time and its interconnectedness with the situation in
Hungary, the Suez Crisis provided black Americans with an area of ready comparisons.
In many respects, the reaction of black Americans to the joint concurrence of the Suez
and Hungarian Crisis more closely resembled that of the Afro-Asian block than that of
their fellow Americans. Black opinion, unlike mainstream opinion, tended morally to
equate the actions of Britain, France, and Israel with those of the Soviet Union. Black
Americans argued that the Suez Crisis, like Hungary, involved a clear case of unjustified
aggression on the part of a larger power(s) and a courageous defense put up by a smaller
nation. Like the Afro-Asian block, many black Americans found themselves "affected by
the plight of Egypt and stimulated by the dramatic and exciting maneuvers of Nasser."'^*'
There are numerous examples of black Americans praising the actions of Nasser. One of
the best examples came from Samuel Hoskins, editor of the Washington Afro-American.
Hoskins even went so far as to compare Nasser to Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoskins
asserted that: "Colonel Nasser, like the Rev. Martin Luther King...are...rallying points for
millions."'^' James L. Hicks expressed a slightly different, though still sympathetic,
perspective: "I don't give a hoot how bad he [Nasser] is, it did not justify England,
France, or Israel...crossing his sovereign borders and shooting down men, women, and
children.'"^^

^^°Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 10.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 12.
^^-Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17.
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Black Americans did generally recognize and appreciate the Eisenhower
administrations' very public condemnation of Britain, France, and Israel. Black
Americans, however, maintained that nowhere in the immense media coverage
surrounding both crises could there be found any sympathy, or even real mention, of the
internal suffering in Egypt. Black critics of American policy argued that Britain, France,
and Israel's attack on Egypt, like the Soviet's attack on Himgary, had left many starving
and homeless refugees. They demanded to know why only the Hungarians deserved
America's offers of aid and refiige.'^^ A reader of the Philadelphia Afro-American
pointed out that: "White America is doing all it can for the Hungarian refugees, but
nothing for Egypt." This reader went on to suggest that "colored Americans...organize
and send money...to help...the destitute people of Egypt.'"^" A December 1956 editorial
sent in to the Amsterdam News expressed similar sentiments when it demanded that
America explain its respective attitudes toward Hungary and Suez:
What is this! Why all this all-out aid for the
Hungarians because the Russians attacked
them...Even special legislation to permit
thousands more into the coimtry...What of
the Egyptian blacks [emphasis added] who

^^^Ibid; Associated Negro Press, 12 December 1956, Features, p. 5 and December
26, 1956, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily World, 2 November 1956, p. 4 and December
12, 1957, p. 4; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 16 March 1957,
p. 8; Philadelphia Afro-American, 17 November 1957, p. 4, November 24, 1956, p. 4,
December 1, 1956, p. 4, December 8, 1956, p. 4, December 22, 1957, p. 4, December 29,
1956, p. 12, January 12, 1957 p. 4, January 26, 1957, p. 4, and March 2, 1957, p. 2; and
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, pp. 8 & 10, December 8, 1956, p. 9, December
22, 1956, p. 4, January 8, 1957, p. 4, and February 9, 1957, p. 9
^-'^Philadelphia Afro-American, 26 January 1957, p. 4.
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were... molested equally as brutally. What
are we doing to relocate them?'^^
While the Suez Crisis provided black Americans v^th the most visible and wellknown comparison to Hungary, they also pointed to many other examples of what they
perceived as American indifference and/or hostility toward the fight of dark-skinned
nations for their freedom. Black Americans also drew unfavorable comparisons between
the United States' response to the Hvmgarian Revolt and its very different reaction to the
Mau Mau Revolt in Kenya. Black Americans viewed the Mau Mau's struggle as a
justified response on the part of the native population to a long history of abuse and
oppression at the hands of Great Britain. Since the turn of the century, Britain had
systematically robbed the native Kikuyus of the best land and forced them into the status
of second-class citizens. In the years following World War II, the Mau Mau, a rebel
organization seeking an independent Kenya, sought to entirely rid Kenya of white rule.
From 1952 to 1954, Britain set out to destroy this organization and put down the larger
more widespread demands for change with incredible ruthlessness and brutality. In their
efforts to quell the rebellion, British forces imprisoned, tortured, and killed thousands of
native Kenyans.
The picture that Great Britain presented to the world, however, was that the Mau
Mau were savages, and that Britain had simply acted out of necessity. Black Americans
argued that the general American public seemed not to question Britain's portrayal of

Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 16.
'-^Plummer, Rising Wind, pp. 239-241.
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events, if it even paid any heed to this crisis at all. Black Americans questioned why
Kenyans, who like Hungarians, fought to be free of foreign domination were seen as
savages and not as freedom fighters. Blacks Americans went on to question why no one
suggested that thousands of Kenyans be lifted from the hands of their oppressors and
brought to the United States as refugees.George Schuyler of the Pittsburgh Courier
reminded Americans of the "hapless Kikiyu people vegetating in Kenya concentration
camps." Schuyler went on to inquire: "Is there a home here for them?'"^^ P.L. Prattis,
also of the Pittsburgh Courier, suggested that maybe the reason for the differing response
to Hungary and Kenya lay in the United States government's and the general public's
belief that "the murder of African natives is an internal affair, not genocide."*^'
The continued riots and protests that accompanied Algeria's quest for
independence from France provided black Americans with yet another a case by which to
measure American concern for Hungary against its reaction to similar events in Africa.
The French had been an unwelcome presence in Algeria since 1830, when their rule was
established by conquest. France, however, continually maintained that Algeria formed an
equal and integral part of the French nation. The political, social, and economic

'^^"Looking and Listening...Practicing Hypocrisy," The Crisis (February 1957):
pp. 89-90; Amsterdam News, 15 December 1957, p. 17, Philadelphia Afro-American, 1
December 1956, p. 4, December 12, 1956, p. 4, and December 22, 1956, p. 4; and
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 8, December 8, 1956, p. 9, January 8, 1957, p.
10, January 26, 1957, p. 9, and February 9, 1957, p. 9.
^Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 9.
Pittsburgh Courier, 24 November 1956, p. 8.
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inequality of the native Algerian population, however, seemed to belie the French
assertions of "equality" and "assimilation." In the early 1950s, the longstanding
discontent simmering just below the surface in Algeria erupted into a violent full-scale
nationalist revolt. As in other revolts and wars involving African nations, the sympathies
of most articulate black Americans lay with the native population. In November 1956, an
editorial in the Pittsburgh Courier argued that black Americans saw "no difference
between Hungary's right to be free from Russian domination and Algeria's right to be
free from French rule."'^° William Worthy of the Philadelphia Afro-American declared
that Soviet satellites, Alabama, and Algeria all had one thing in common: "After long
periods of suffering the people are refusing to be lackeys any longer.""'
Black Americans further believed that, unlike in Hungary, the United States did
not wholly side with those who fought for freedom in Algeria.George M. Houser of
the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) argued that the United States had "implicitly
backed the French in the Algerian conflict."'^^ The belief among black Americans that

Philadelphia Afro-American, 17 November 1956, p. 4.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 3 November 1956, p. 23.
^^^Associated Negro Press, 2 January 1957, Features, p. 9 and February 27, 1957,
Deadline, p. 6; Atlanta Daily World, 5 January 1957, p. 6 and February 13, 1957, p. 3;
Philadelphia Afro-American, 3 November 1956, p. 23, November 17, 1956, p. 4, and
December 8, 1956, p. 4; Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2; and "Practicing
Hypocrisy," p. 89.
'^^To back up this assertion, Houser pointed to a March 1956 statement by C.
Douglas Dillon, American ambassador to France, in which Dillon agreed with French
officials that "the four departments of Algeria are French territory." Houser further
asserted that the United States government had lent France helicopters, which France then
utilized against Algerian nationalists. See Draft ACOA Policy on Algeria, George M.
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their nation cared little about Algeria, while it poured forth its sympathy for Hungary, can
be seen in the words of Alice A. Dunnigan of the Associated Negro Press. In discussing
the admission of the Hungarian refugees, Dunnigan sarcastically commented on what she
saw as American indifference to events in Algeria: "As America extends open arms to
the Hungarians..what about...lending a little sympathy to the black [emphasis added]
citizens of revolt-torn Algeria.'"^'* A reader of the Pittsburgh Courier even more directly
questioned whether race determined where America's sympathies lay. Referring to the
tremendous outpouring of support for Hungary's fi-eedom fighters, this reader demanded
to know: "Is this freedom...labeled or colored...If not, then why are we so mum for
freedom of...Algerians?"'^'
The situation in South Africa provided black Americans with yet another instance
by which to measxire the United States' action on behalf of Hungary against inaction
when it came to dark-skinned peoples. White rule had been a de facto reality in South
Afnca since the late nineteenth century. However, it was not until the May 1948 election
of Daniel Malan and his Nationalist Party that South Africa embarked upon the official
and very brutal policy of strict segregation of the races which came to be known as
apartheid. Under apartheid, black South Africans had little to no political or economic

Houser to the Executive and Advisory Boards of the ACOA, April 13, 1956, Africa:
American Committee. 1954-1969 (and undated). Reel 3, The Papers of A. Philip
Randolph (Bethesda: University Publications of America).
Associated Negro Press, 2 January 1957, Features, p. 9.
^^^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2.

rights. Anyone who dared oppose this blatantly unjust system faced jail or even death.
The recentness of events, combined with the growing identification of many black
Americans with colored nations, pushed South Africa into the forefront of black
Americans' overseas concerns. It was only natural therefore, that many in the black
media drew upon America's policies and attitudes toward South Afnca for comparisons
to the Himgarian Crisis.
Many individuals in the black media, as well as the general public, argued that
the brutalities in South Afnca received little attention either from the United States
government or the mainstream media. In an editorial to the Norfolk Journal and Guide,
Dr. Wendell C. Somerville maintained that black Americans did, in fact, understand their
fellow Americans concern for Hungary.'^' Somerville, however, also pointed out that
such displays of empathy would seem far less hypocritical to black Americans if
extended to "all peoples of every land who are victims of cruel oppression." Somerville
concluded by reminding his fellow Americans that: "Freedom means freedom, even to

'^^For a description of the emergence of apartheid see Thomas Borstelmann,
Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and South Africa in the Early Cold War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. vii & viii & 3-4.
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17, December 22, 1956, p. 25, and
December 25, 1956, p. 6, Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9,
December 31, 1956, Deadline, p. 5, January 2, 1957, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily
World, 1 January 1957, p. 6 and January 5, 1957, p. 6; Norfolk Journal and Guide
(National-Virginia Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6; Philadelphia Afro-American, 8
December 1956, p. 4, December 12, 1956, p. 4, and January 5, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh
Courier. 8 January 1957, p. 10, January 12, 1957, p. 2, and February 2, 1957, p. 8.

the people of Africa."'^^ The juxtaposition of the Hungarian Crisis with apartheid in
South Africa could also be seen on a sign commemorating Himian Rights Day in 1956.
This sign, photographed by the Amsterdam News, bore a slogan which illustrated the
irritation of black Americans with what they perceived as the exclusive and excessive
attention paid to Hungary: "On Human Rights Day - Let Us Pray for Hungary and South
Africa!!"'^'
The Chicago Defender contrasted the American treatment of Hungary with its
treatment of South Africa in the United Nations. The Defender argued that, while the
United States actively sought to place the situation in Hungary before the UN, it failed to
support similar attempts on behalf of black South Africans. In its editorial column, "Our
Opinions," the Defender pointed out that United States representatives had either
abstained from voting, or actively opposed, every attempt by the Afro-Asian block to
place the internal problems in South Africa on the General Assembly's agenda. This
editorial compared these actions to the repeated efforts by Henry Cabot Lodge to secure
the presence of UN observers in Himgary. The Defender went on to argue that if the
United Nations' charter allowed for the presence of UN observers in Himgary, then it
should also allow for the presence of observers in South Africa: "Either the [G]eneral
[A]ssembly has the authority to consider domestic policies that come clearly within the
purview of human rights or it does not...inquiry into the racial policy of the Union is as

^^^Norfolk Journal and Guide (Virginia-National Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6.
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25.
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legitimate..as that proposed for Hungary."""'
The Chicago Defender also reached further back in history for a case by which to
consider the United States' reaction to the invasion of Hungary against its reaction to
similar events in an African nation. Though it occurred two decades earlier, Benito
Mussolini's brutal invasion of Ethiopia provided some of the best parallels to the Soviet
invasion of Hungary. Like Hungary, Ethiopia had mounted a brave, but ultimately rather
futile defense. In a manner similar to Imre Nagy, Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian emperor,
had turned to the international conraiunity for its assistance. In a November 17, 1956
issuance of its "Our Opinions" column, the Defender compared the United States
government's prompt introduction of UN resolutions and heavy use of moral influence on
behalf of Hungary with its haste to enact neutrality legislation and avoid any and all
involvement in the 1935 Ethiopian Crisis. This editorial asserted that, though not an
official member of the League of Nations in the 1930s, the United States could have, and
should have, employed its tremendous moral influence to initiate punitive international
action against Italy. Had America done so, the Defender argued, then Mussolini might
have been forced into an untenable international position and withdrawn his troops."'"
Black Americans further pointed out that they were virtually alone in their efforts
to help the Ethiopian victims of Italian aggression. The efforts of black Americans in the
1930s on behalf of Ethiopia, in fact, bore a striking resemblance to that of white

^^^Chicago Defender, 15 December 1956, p. 9.
^'^^Chicago Defender, 17 November 1956, p. 9.

lA
Americans in the 1950s on behalf of Himgary. Unlike the later response to the Hungarian
Crisis, most Americans in the 1930s feared war more than they sympathized with the
victims of invasion. An anonymous editorial in the Chicago Defender presented a highly
imfavorable comparison of the American public's very warm and sympathetic response to
the Hungarian refugees with what many black Americans saw as a lack of concern for the
Ethiopian victims of Mussolini's invasion. This editorial coldly noted that "no one
seemed to get excited about help or 'safe haven' for the Ethiopians when Benito
Mussolini...crushed these helpless and defenseless people."'"*^ Black Americans believed
that, though other factors influenced America's reaction to the two crisis, race once again
played the deciding role in dictating when and where Americaiis would act on behalf of
victims of aggression.'"^ The Associated Negro Press recalled how "Ethiopia was
ravished and raped by the Italians." The Associated Negro Press then, somewhat
sarcastically, questioned where "was the inclination of big-hearted American to enact
emergency aid relief to the starving, destitute and dying black [emphasis added] people
there?'"""
For black Americans, the same "color line" that existed in international affairs
also characterized events at home. In addition to comparing the struggle of colonial

^'^^Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957, p. 10.
^^^Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 17; Associated Negro Press, 26
December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9; Atlanta Daily World, 26 December 1956, p. 4 and
February 26, 1957, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957, p. 10; and Philadelphia
Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 19.
Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9.
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peoples to the events in Hungary, black Americans also drew analogies between their
own struggle and that of Hungary. The crisis in Hungary came just as the Civil Rights
Movement had began to emerge. Their own struggles against the force of oppression at
home led many black Americans to equate their fight against Jim Crow with the
Hungarians' fight against communist rule. At the NAACP's 48th Annual Convention,
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, noted that black Americans foimd little "discernible
difference between the dictatorship of skin color in certain of the Southern States and the
dictatorship of communism in Hungary.'"'*^ Those in the black media, in fact, often
referred to the South as the "cotton curtain." The Atlanta Daily World argued that the
continued existence of this "cotton curtain" constituted a force as "strong and cruel and
different from true democracy as the Russian Iron Curtain."'"^
Many leading figures in the black media and improvement organizations pointed
out that the tactics used by racists to maintain Jim Crow rule were just as, if not more,
brutal than those used by Soviet troops to preserve Russian domination in Hungary. To
illustrate their case, they pointed to the riots, beatings, bombings, and even murders that

"•^Gloster B. Current, "At the Crossroad - and Beyond," The Crisis (AugustSeptember 1957): p. 435 and "Address of Roy Wilkins, New York City, executive
secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, at closing
mass meeting of 48th Annual NAACP Convention, Olympia Stadium, Detroit, Mich.,
June 30, 1957, 3 PM, EST," p. 3 in 1957 Speeches, Annual Convention File, NAACP
Administration 1956-65, Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, Supplement to Part I - 1956-1960 (Bethesda: University Publication of
America), [hereafter cited as NAACP Papers - 1956-1960]

Atlanta Daily World, 30 October 1956, p. 6.
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accompanied black Americans' struggle for Civil Rights. Numerous articles and
editorials described how efforts to desegregate schools in Clinton, Tennessee brought out
white mobs that violently harassed black students, destroyed the property of local blacks,
beat a sympathetic white minister, and eventually even blew up the school itself. The
brutal murder of fourteen year old Emmett Till for allegedly whistling at a white woman
provided the black media with a vivid and terrible incident to compare with Soviet
actions in Himgary. Black newspapers also pointed accusingly toward Montgomery,
Alabama, where white racists beat men, women, and children; bombed the homes of local
Black ministers; and shot up buses."*' For many black Americans, these incidents, and
countless others like them, clearly demonstrated that racial violence in the United States
constituted an "evil not less despicable than that in Himgary.'""^
Black Americans compared the speed with which the Eisenhower administration
aided the Himgarian Revolt with what they perceived to be the administration's rather

147"1956 Annual Report of the Washington Bureau," p. 3 and "The NAACP In
1956 By Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, Report to the Annual Meeting, January 7,
1957, National Office, New York City," (both in Annual Meeting - General 1956-58,
General Office File, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960; Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956,
p. 16; Associated Negro Press, 28 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9; Atlanta Daily World, 30
October 1956, p. 6 and December 4, 1957, p. 6; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Carolina
Edition), 2 February 1957, pp. 1-2 and February 16, 1957, p. 4; Norfolk Journal and
Guide (Home Edition), 2 January 1957, pp. 1-2; Norfolk Journal and Guide (NationalVirginia Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 6, January 19, 1957, p. 8, and February 16, 1957, p.
3; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Pennsylvania Edition), 5 January 1957, p. 5 and February
2, 1957, pp. 1-2; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Portsmouth Edition), 2 January 1957, pp. 12; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, pp. 4 & 19, January 26, 1957, p. 4,
February 16, 1957, p. 4, and February 23, 1957, p. 4.
Atlanta Daily World, 30 October 1956, p. 6.
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slow and timid action on the problem of racial violence in the South."*' The Courier
Press Service reported that "thousands of Negroes are puzzled about the tremendous
interest being shown by the federal government in the plight of Hungarian refugees while
the homes of Negroes in Alabama and other U.S. towns have been bombed and blasted
without the criminals being apprehended.'"^" The black media pointed out that many
leading Negro newspapers had seen Eisenhower as a potential champion of their cause,
and encouraged their readers to vote for him based on his assumption.'^' A black women
from Virginia wrote an angry letter to Eisenhower declaring: I voted for you...I think
your duty lies right here in America...All over the United States there are injustices being
done to Negroes, and you have to worry about Hungary.'"^^

""Mrs. Gwendolyn Moore to President Eisenhower, December 18, 1956 and Mr.
L.A. Jaramillo to President Eisenhower, January 13, 1957 (both in President Letters
Received (1-3), Box 8, Records of the President's Committee on Hvmgarian Refugee
Relief, Eisenhower Library; Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Associated Negro
Press, 28 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9 and February 20,1957, Deadline, p. 12; Chicago
Defender, 2 February 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January 1957, p. 2 £ind
January 26, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2, January 26, 1957,
p. 11, February 2, 1957, p. 8, and February 9, 1957, p. 9.
^^°Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2.
'^'A number of leading Black newspapers including the Norfolk Journal and
Guide, Virginia; Baltimore Afro-American, Maryland; Amsterdam News, New York City;
Black Dispatch, Oklahoma City; Negro Labor News, Houston; Louisiana Weekly, New
Orleans; Omaha Guide, Nebraska; Tri-State Defender, Memphis; The Philadelphia
Independent', Carolina Times, Durham; Wilmington Journal, North Carolina; and
Cleveland Call and Post, Ohio urged their readers to vote for Eisenhower in 1956. In
addition, Adam Clayton Powell, a leading black Democrat, also broke with his party to
endorse Eisenhower's candidacy for President.

'^^Mrs. Gwendolyn Moore to President Eisenhower, December 18, 1956.

The Eisenhower administration's response to the Hungarian crisis provided black
Americans with many examples of just what steps could be taken to promote civil rights
and put an end to the violence sweeping across the South. The Eisenhower
administration had repeatedly issued statements demanding an immediate end to the
Soviet Union's violence against Himgary. On January 11,1957 a group of prominent
Southern black leaders urged Eisenhower to utilize the "weight of his office" similarly on
behalf of the Southern Negro. These leaders begged Eisenhower to come to the South
and personally speak out against the violence and continued defiance of the Supreme
Court's desegregation orders. However, black Americans soon realized that no such visit
would be forthcoming.'^^ An editorial in the Philadelphia Afro-American sarcastically
suggested that "he [Eisenhower] might well have been to busy arranging further aid and
refuge to the oppressed Htmgarians.'"^"
In addition to denoimcing the Soviet Union, Eisenhower had sent his VicePresident, Richard Nixon, to Austria to report on the conditions of the Hungarian
refugees and provide suggestions for their relief. The same leaders who pressed for
Eisenhower to denounce racism and violence also hoped that Nixon could travel to the
South and issue a report similar to what he had done with regards to the Hungarian

Associated Negro Press, 14 February 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia AfroAmerican, 26 January 1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4, and February 16, 1957, p. 4; and
Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 11.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 26 January 1957, p. 4.
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refugees.'^' Numerous articles and editorials throughout the black press repeated this
suggestion. A Courier reader writing from San Antonio, Texas demanded to know why
"if Mr. Nixon has traveled thousands of miles to look in on the Hungarian situation...[he]
can't...travel just a few hundred miles to look in on the Alabama situation."'^^ Black
Americans viewed Nixon's, like Eisenhower's, failure to make a personal tour of the
South as illustrative of the administration's obsession with events overseas at the expense
of neglecting important domestic matters.'^'
While most black Americans accused the Eisenhower administration of inaction,
rather than any real animosity toward their cause, they could also point to staunch
advocates of Jim Crow among the many supporters of Himgarian refugee relief. In many
respects, James O. Eastland, a Democratic Senator from Mississippi, epitomized
Dixiecrat racism. On numerous occasions, Eastland loudly condemned the Supreme
Court's desegregation orders and even accused the Court being an instrument of
communism. Yet this same man, according to many in the black press, actively and

'^^No copy of the original request was found. However, The Bayard Rustin
Papers contain a February 14, 1957 second request, again making specific reference to
Hungary. See Telegram from the Southern Negro Leaders Conference to Vice-President
Richard Nixon, February 14, 1957 in General Correspondence, 1943-1987, Reel 20, The
Bayard Rustin Papers (Bethesda; University Publications of America).
^^^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2.
Associated Negro Press, 14 FebruEiry 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia AfroAmerican, 19 January 1957, pp. 1-2, January 26, 1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4, and
February 16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2 and February 9,
1957, p. 9.
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wholeheartedly supported the admission of thousands of Hungarian refugees."^ In a brief
column entitled, "No Room to Talk," the Philadelphia Afro-American scomfiilly noted
that "James O. Eastland, Mississippi's dixiecrat gift to the United States Senate, is all
heated up over the situation in Hungary." The Afro reminded its readers of the brutal
murder of Emmett Till. It then pointed out that Eastland failed to express any outrage at
this terrible crime, which occurred much closer to home.'^® This column concluded by
contending that protests against Russian aggression in Hungary "have a hollow ring
indeed when made by men like Senator Eastland."'^"
Representative Francis Walter, Republican from Pennsylvania, received similar,
though somewhat less strident, criticism from the black community for his participation
in America's Hungarian relief effort. The Associated Negro Press pointed out that
throughout his career Walter had consistently opposed any relaxation of immigration
standards, particularly those affecting "brown-skinned peoples." Now, however, this
once adamant opponent of relaxed immigration standards stood up to champion the cause
of Hungary's rebels. After witnessing the shooting of fleeing Himgarians by the Soviets,
Walter returned home with the recommendation that rather than tapering off Hungarian
immigration, the United States should, instead, accept more refiagees than it had

^^^AssociatedNegro Press, 5 December 1956, Features, pp. 15-16; Atlanta Daily
World, 6 January 1957, p. 3; Norfi)lk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 12
January 1957, p. 9; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4.
'^^Emmett Till was lynched in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi.
^^Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4.
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originally planned.'^' Upon hearing the news of Walter's change of heart, a black citizen
from Philadelphia commented that: "1 don't remember Mr. Walter becoming outraged at
the murder of a boy in Mississippi.'""
Black Americans also pointed accusingly toward the attitude of the American
people in general. The public loved the notion of doing whatever it could to help the
Hungarians. Rather than having to be pushed and prodded by their government to help
out, the public actually dragged a somewhat reluctant administration into providing
increased aid. The majority of voices in Congress and the media spoke out
sympathetically on behalf of the Hungarians. Churches, charitable institutions, and the
general public all gave very willingly of their time and money to assist the Hungarians in
any maimer they could. Everywhere they looked, black Americans saw their fellow
citizens exhorting the government to do even more to help the Hungarians. However,
black Americans argued that these same individuals and groups tended to be at best
apathetic, and at worst resentful, toward the cries for help from Southern Negroes.'" Lin
Holloway, of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, noted that: "It is gratifying to see

Associated Negro Press" 5 December 1956, Features, pp. 15-16 and
Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4 and March 9,1957, p. 4.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 2 February 1957, p. 4.
^^^Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 16 and December 22, 1956, p. 5;
Associated Negro Press, 30 January 1957, Deadline, pp. 6-7; Atlanta Daily World, 25
November 1956, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9; Norfolk Journal and
Guide (Home Edition), 12 January 1957, p. 14; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January
1957, pp. 4 & 19, January 19,1957, p. 4, January 26,1957, p. 4, February 2, 1957, p. 4,
February 9, 1957. p. 4, and February 16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January
1957, p. 2 and February 2, 1957, p. 8.
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Americans rallying to the aid of oppressed people in Hungary. Such a wide-spread
interest in the welfare of humans may soon spread to Dixieland.'"^ In the Chicago
Defender, Langston Hughes utilized his imaginary character ("Simple") to express his
disgust: "With all this..ain't-it-a-shame about the Hungarians, there is nary a word
about...the Negroes that cannot vote in Mississippi.'"®^ At a convention for the National
Committee for Rural Schools, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. also registered his disapproval
of the public's attitude: "Americans are so concerned about the Hungarians - but it is
strange that they have not the slightest concern about the Negroes in Mississippi and
Alabama."'®^
Many in the black press argued that the mainstream media and entertainment
world also deserved criticism for their inattention to the fight of black America,
especially in contrast with their enthusiasm for the struggle in Hungary.'®^ Baker E.
Morton, radio and television commentator for the Associated Negro Press, accused the
media of "going overboard for drama growing out of Hungary's plight while ignoring the
same drama right under their noses in the Negro plight.'"®® Morton pointed to the rash of

Norfolk Journal and Guide (Home Edition), 12 January 1957, p. 14.
^^^Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9.
^^Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 5.
Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956, Features, pp. 8-9, December 31,
1956, Deadline, pp. 8-9, February 6, 1957, Features, pp. 12-13, and March 13, 1957,
Features, p. \ \-, Atlanta Daily World, 26 December 1956, p. 4 and January 3, 1957, p. 2;
and Philadelphia Afro-American, 12 January 1957, p. 4.
^^^Associated Negro Press, 31 December 1956, Deadline, p. 9.
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stories about Hungary airing on television with dramatic titles such as "Flight from
Budapest" and "Passport to Life." He further pointed to how effectively radio and
television producers employed their mediums to highlight the Hungarians' quest for
freedom. Morton argued that radio and television could, and should, be used with equal
zeal to attack racial oppression and hatred in America. The Philadelphia Afro-American
expressed similar regrets that the American media remained "too busy watching Europe
to note that an identical struggle was taking place right here." In particular, the Afro took
issue with Time's selection of the Hungarian freedom fighter as "Man of the Year." The
Afro declared that "our choice would have been a freedom fighter, too...the Rev. Martin
Luther King, Jimior."'®'
Black observers went on to point out that in the eyes of the American media and
general public alike, Hungarians who used force to defy their oppressors were heroes.
The NAACP's Roy Wilkins contrasted this attitude with that of many Americans toward
even peaceful Negro resistance: "When Hungarians resist oppression they are called
heroes, when American Negroes...peacefully resist oppression they are called
agitators.""" America exhorted its black citizens to be patient and move cautiously in
their quest for freedom and equality. This attitude existed even among the black

Philadelphia Afro-American, 12 January 1957, p. 4.
'^Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 435 and Wilkins' Address at 48th Annual
Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960.

community and white supporters of civil rights.''' Hungarians, however, received
immense cheering and support when they attempted to seize their freedom with force.
The Chicago Defender pointed out that at the same time America rushed to commend
Hungary's freedom fighters; "We have native fighters for freedom...to whom no word of
sympathy or encouragement is extended.'"'^ Black Americans demanded to known why
the Hungarians' fight against tyranny and oppression deserved all the cheers and
accolades, when so many Americans remained either hostile or indifferent to the equally
courageous fight of black Americans at home.'" A Pittsburgh Courier reader from San
Antonio, Texas angrily noted the respective response of Americans to the Hungarians'
and Negroes' struggles for freedom: "On every newscast and in every newspaper, the
Hungarians are being praised and lauded for their...fight...against enslaved
conditions...While...instead of being praised...we are being bombed and shot at like clay

"'In his "Letter From Birmingham Jail" of April 16,1963 King utilized the
Hvmgarian Revolution, among other examples, to address the fears of some of his fellow
clergymen regarding his acts of civil disobedience. No doubt remembering the intense
displays of support for Himgary's dissidents. King defended the use of civil disobedience
in the fight for equality by declaring: "There is nothing new about this kind of civil
disobedience...We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did...was 'legal' and
everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did...was 'illegal.'" See Martin Luther King,
Jr., Why We Can't Wait (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 86-87.
"^Chicago Defender, 2 February 1957, p. 9
^''^Chicago Defender, 27 January 1957, p. 9 and February 2, 1957, p. 9;
Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4; Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December
1956, p. 8, January 8, 1957, p. 8, and January 12, 1957, p. 2; Current, "At the Crossroad,"
p. 435; and Wilkins' Address at 48th Annual Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP
Papers - 1956-1960.
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pigeons.'"'"'
In addition to comparing the action of America's civil rights leaders to Hungary's
freedom fighters, black Americans also compared Southern Negroes fleeing racial
violence to Hungarians fleeing Russian troops. The Philadelphia Afro-American reported
on a address given by a Reverend J. Herbert Nelson to students at Allen University. In
this address. Nelson held the Reverend J.A. DeLaine, who fled South Carolina in the face
of violent reprisals for his efforts to desegregate schools in Clarendon County, up as an
example of the "classic refugee." Nelson went on the declare that: "No Hungarian loves
liberty and freedom more than J.A. DeLaine.""^ Many throughout the black press and
public questioned why no relief programs were extended to such colored "refugees."
These critics noted that when Southern Negroes, like DeLaine, moved North to escape
the violence, they often encountered irritated Northerners who ignored their plight, or
quietly shunted them off to the de facto segregation and ghettos that existed in most urban
areas. The Amsterdam News pointed out that a "Hungarian who slips out of Budapest...is
called a 'freedom fighter.' The Negro who slips away from a lynch town...and arrives in
Detroit or Chicago...is apt to be regarded as 'a problem.'"'^ Such attitudes reinforced the
deepening conviction of black Americans that their nation cared more about white

^''^Pittsburgh Courier, 12 January 1957, p. 2.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January 1957, p. 5.
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 4.
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foreigners than its Negro citizens.'"'''
Black Americans who flocked to the Hungarian cause, without first establishing
themselves as defenders of their own people, did not escape censure by the black
community. Louis Armstrong, the famous trumpet player, received harsh criticism for
his role in the Hungarian relief effort. The focus of black Americans' criticism involved
Armstrong's benefit concert in London on December 18, 1956. Armstrong canceled
already scheduled appearances in the United States, paid all his own expenses, and
donated the entire proceeds, some 14,000 dollars, toward Hungarian refugee relief Baker
E. Morton pointed out that he "never recalled 'Satch'...advocating Negro relief""^ The
criticism of Armstrong in the black media had its roots in his frequent appearances before
white, segregated audiences in the South. One Southern black from McCain, North
Carolina questioned how "Southern bom" Armstrong could "put Hungary before the
colored man and forget that charity begins at home."'^' These and other critics demanded
to know when, or even if, Armstrong plaimed on giving a similar benefit performance on
behalf of the Civil Rights Movement.'*"

"'W.W. Hensel to President Eisenhower, February 20, 1957, President Letters
Received (1-3), Box 8, Records of the President's Committee on Hungarian Refugee
Relief, Eisenhower Library; Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 4; Associated Negro
Press, 26 December 1957, Deadline, p. 15; Philadelphia Afro-American, 19 January
1957, p. 5 and February 23, 1957 p. 4; Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 435; and Wilkins'
Address at 48th Annual Convention, June 30 1957, p. 4, NAACP Papers - 1956-1960.
Associated Negro Press, 6 February 1957, Features, p. 13.
^''^Philadelphia Afro-American, 23 March 1957, p. 4.
^^^AssociatedNegro Press, 6 February 1957, Features, pp. 12-13 and Philadelphia
Afro-American, 9 March 1957, p. 4, March 23, 1957, p. 4, and March 30, 1957, p. 4.
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Aside from feeling hurt and abandoned that their nation seemed to care more
about the Hungarians than its own black citizens, many black Americans also feared the
potential economic impact of such a large number of white immigrants. Harkening back
to the bitter competition between Negroes and white irrunigrants at the turn of the
century, George Schuyler pointed out that "European immigration has never been helpfiil
to the American Negro historically."'*' By the 1950s, black Americans, while still facing
intense job discrimination and frequent unemployment, had slowly began to move up the
economic ladder. Much of their opposition to the Hungarian refugees arose from the fear
that they would again lose the economic gains they had so recently acquired.'*^ Black
Americans could not help but notice the eagerness with which their fellow Americans
offered the Himgarians employment opportunities of all kinds. This awareness,
combined with the precarious natvire of their own economic status, caused a substantial
number of black Americans to view the admission of thousands of Hungarians with
imeasy suspicion.'*^ The National Urban League, which had historically concentrated it

Pittsburgh Courier, January 26, 1957, p. 9.
'^^The fear that Himgarian immigration would have an adverse economic effect on
black Americans had the most basis in fact in the Cleveland area. Of the approximately
32,000 Hungarian refugees granted asylum in the United States, over 10,000 settled in
Cleveland, Ohio.
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14; Associate Negro Press, 5 December
1957, Features, pp. 15-16 and February 20, 1957, Deadline, p. 12; Atlanta Daily World,
25 November 1956, p. 4 and January 19, 1957, p. 3; Chicago Defender, 9 February 1957,
p. 10 and February 23, 1957, p. 10; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia
Edition), 26 January 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4, and
March 30, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 8, January 12,
1957, p. 2, January 26, 1957, p. 9, and February 9, 1957, p. 9.
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efforts on improving the economic status of black Americans, was particularly concerned
with this issue. Lester Granger, head of the National Urban League, reported the most
commonly asked question of black workers as being: "Will they [Hungarian refugees] be
taking our jobs...our promotions?'"^"
Many black Americans from aroimd the nation also raised the related issue of
housing. In the 1950s, neighborhoods remained segregated, with whites generally
occupying the more desirable areas. Those black Americans who could afford to
purchase a home in a white neighborhood faced tremendous obstacles. Existing owners
frequently refused to sell, or even show, their homes to Negro buyers. Those who did
sell, almost always did so at a vastly inflated price. Blacks who did finally move into
white neighborhoods often faced critical daily scrutiny and complete exclusion from
neighborhood activities. For most black Americans, however, even this situation usually
constituted an improvement over the expensive rents and substandard housing so many
faced. At the same time governmental and private organizations did so much to locate
decent, affordable housing for the Hungarian refugees, many black Americans lived in
horrible conditions.'®' One Brooklyn resident wrote to the Amsterdam News complaining
of the poor state of New York Public Housing. This individual pointed to conditions so
bad that they actually posed substantial risks to the safety and health of the occupants.

Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14.
'^'"Looking and Listening...Housing," The Crisis (March 1957): pp. 228-230;
Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, pp. 5 & 14; Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January
1957, p.4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 26 January 1957, p. 9.

The writer went on to relate these conditions to attention given by so many, in and out of
government, to the Hungarians' housing needs. She pointed out that "our leaders look
out for the refugees

" But what, she asked, "about the health, safety and freedom of us

Negroes here?'"*®
Black Americans also noted the immense disparity between educational
opportimities offered to the Hungarian refugees and those denied to themselves. Even
though Brown v. Board of Education had legally ended segregation in public schools,
educational equality remained elusive. The Pittsburgh Courier reported on the large
number of scholarships being offered to the incoming Himgarian refugees. The Courier
observed that these generous offers came at a time when education for black Americans
remained woefully imder-funded. The Courier concluded that "evidently it is more
advantageous to be a Hungarian refugee than a black citizen.'"®^ Furthermore, black
Americans could not help but feel bitter when they witnessed Hungarian refugees being
warmly welcomed at the same educational institutions which fought so stubbornly to
avoid compliance with Brown v. Board of Education.^^^ This bitterness was reflected in
an unsigned editorial sent in to the Philadelphia Afro-American fi-om a black resident of

Amsterdam News, 2 February 1957, p. 14.
Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 9
'^^Suzanne Smith, "Crisis in the South," The Crisis (January 1957): pp. 5-7;
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1956, p. 16; Atlanta Daily World, 1 January 1957, p. 6,
January 5, 1957, p. 6, and January 19, 1957, p. 3; Chicago Defender, 27 January 1957, p.
9; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 26 January 1957, p. 9;
Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, pp. 4 & 19; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29
December 1956, p. 9.

Alabama. This writer reported on the recent admission of a number of Hungarian
refugees to the University of Alabama. This Alabama native maintained that "good will
for these aliens pervaded the campus."'®' This writer then went on to point out that such
hospitality stood in "sharp contrast" to Alabama's treatment of Autherine Lucy."°
At heart, what bothered most black Americans was that their government and
fellow Americans seemed to prefer to help white foreigners over American citizens, who
also happened to be black. Black leaders, columnists, and private individuals all stressed
that their citizenship and long residence in the United States entitled them, not some
foreigners, to their nation's primary consideration. Instead, what black Americans saw
was the rights and privileges their country had so long denied them being handed over
freely to the newly arriving Hungarians. One black laborer remarked that "these people
can come here, even without the ability to speak English, and obtain the best jobs...I have
been here all my life. More than this, I'm an American citizen"'®' In an imaginary
conversation with a supporter of Hungarian relief Langston Hughes' "Simple" expressed
similar sentiments. Simple argued that "colored folks have been in this here U.S.A. a
long time...and yet, you mean to tell me a Hungarian what has been here a half-hour is

Philadelphia Afro-American, 5 January 1957, p. 4.
"°In February 1956 Autherine Lucy became the first Negro to ever attend the
University of Alabama. Lucy's presence at the University of Alabama was met with
threats to her life, brutal attacks on faculty who attempted to defend her, and intense
rioting. Rather than seeking punishment for the perpetrators of such acts, the university
instead expelled Lucy after only three days of attendance.
Atlanta Daily World, 25 November 1956, p. 4-
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worth more.""^ Black Americans further pointed out that all the aid to the Hungarians
cost taxpayer money, including their own."^ Blacks Americans felt it profoundly unfair
that they should have to pay for services and privileges denied them and given to
foreigners instead.'^''
While black Americans tended to view racial discrimination and violence in
America as an evil equal to, if not greater than, communism, this equation should not be
interpreted as indicating any large scale presence of pro-communist sentiments among the
black population. Rather, most black Americans of the 1950s fell squarely within the
Cold War consensus. Black Americans, like most other Americans in the 1950s, firmly

^^^Chicago Defender, 23 February 1957, p. 10.
'^^Some black Americans angrily pointed to the United States government's plan
to confiscate the assets of Joe Louis, boxing heavyweight champion of the world, in order
to satisfy interest and fines on his back taxes. In particular, the govenmient's plan to
seize the trust fund which Louis had set up for his young children infuriated black
Americans. For many black Americans, Louis was an icon, and the government's action
against him an absolute outrage. These critics demanded to know how the U.S.
government could be so charitable to the Hungarians, and yet cruel enough to impoverish
one of its most famous black citizens. (Associated Negro Press, 26 December 1956,
Features, pp. 14-15 and Philadelphia Afro-American, 22 December 1956, p. 2, December
29,1956, p. 4, January 5,1957, p. 4, and March 30,1957, p. 4.)
''"•Mrs. Peggy E. Nimnally to President Eisenhower, December 20, 1956; Mrs. J.F.
Gene Rees to President Eisenhower, January 12,1957; and Mr. L.A. Jaramillo to
President Eisenhower, January 13,1957 (all in President Letters Received (1-3), Box 8,
Records of the President's Committee on Hungarian Refugee Relief, Eisenhower
Library); Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Atlanta Daily World, 25 November
1956, p. 4, December 9, 1956, p. 4, January 1, 1957, p. 6, January 19, 1957, p. 3, January
29, 1957, p. 6; Chicago Defender, 12 January 1957, p. 9, February 9, 1957, p. 10, and
February 23, 1957, p. 10; Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 26
January 1957, p. 9; Philadelphia Afro-American, 22 December 1956, p. 4 and February
16, 1957, p. 4; and Pittsburgh Courier, 29 December 1956, p. 8, January 1, 1957, p. 10,
and January 26, 1957, p. 11.
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Americans, like some white Americans, argued against the admission of the Hungarians
based on the fear that some might be Soviet spies and communist infiltrators. Some
black Americans, again like some white Americans, maintained that the vast majority of
Hungarian refugees had not fought so much against Communism per se, as for
Nationalist communism and/or socialism."^
The editorials of John B. Henderson of the Norfolk Journal and Guide further
illustrated how black Americans viewed racism as often worse than communism, and yet
also remained ardently anti-communist. On December 15,1956 in an editorial regarding
the situation in Hungary, Henderson declared that: "The Communists' true nature stood
revealed with all of its beastly cruelty and primitive savagery.""^ Then on December 22,
1956, again in the context of Hungary, Henderson referred to the "oppressive rule of
Russian communism.'"'^ On January 19 1957, however, he produced another editorial
which, if taken out of context, might be interpreted as a softening of his earlier position.
When comparing the tactics used to sustain Jim Crow rule with those used to maintain
Soviet domination of Hungary he wrote: "The Communists may parade in heavy tanks
though the cities of Hungary...but they, at least, do it in the daytime so that you know

Amsterdam News, 19 January 1957, p. 14; Atlanta Daily World, 1 January
1957, p. 1; and Pittsburgh Courier, 8 December 1956, p. 9, January 12,1957, p. 8,
January 26,1957, p. 9, February 2, 1957, p. 8, and March 2, 1957, p. 9.
Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 15 December 1956, p.
8.

Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 22 December 1956, p.
8.
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what they are and can fight back. Communists don't hide under the cover of darkness
and hurl bombs at churches and residences.'"'® Rather than viewing this statement, or
similar statements by other black leaders and media figures, as a change of heart or as
containing any pro-Soviet sympathies whatsoever, it should interpreted as the stem
indictment of Jim Crow it was meant to be."'
Black Americans also remained keenly aware of the interconnected nature of the
United States' racial problems, its international image, and the Cold War. A number of
black Americans pointed out that if America ever hoped to maintain credibility,
particularly with the Afro-Asian block, than it must make an effort to "aid all nations not
just white" and "clean up its own backyard."^"" On December 29, 1956 the Philadelphia
Afro-American reported on how Pravda, the Soviet Union's official newsletter,
responded to the Eisenhower administration's condenmation of Soviet actions in Hungary
with its own charge that: "The United States does not ensure elementary human rights in
its own country."^'" In Fight for Freedom, Langston Hughes also pointed to the "field

^^^Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 19 January 1957, p. 8.
•''It should be further noted that Henderson also compares white racists to bank
robbers and other similarly despicable types.
Amsterdam News, 15 December 1957, p. 16; Associated Negro Press: 5
December 1956, Deadline, p. 7, December 26, 1956, Features, pp. 8-9, January 30, 1957,
Deadline, pp. 6-7, February 20, 1957, Deadline, p. 12, and February 27, 1957, Deadline,
p. 6, Atlanta Daily World, 9 December 1956, p. 4, January 5, 1957, p. 6, and February
20, 1957, p. 2; Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 2 and January 5,
1957, p. 2; Current, "At the Crossroad," p. 431; Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 157-158;
and "Practicing Hypocrisy," pp. 89-90.
Philadelphia Afro-American, 29 December 1956, p. 2.

day" Iron Curtain countries were having with reports of racial violence in the South.
When the United States condemned the puppet regime of Janos Kadar, Kadar simply
replied that: "Those who tolerate that a people should be persecuted because of the color
of their skin have no right to preach...liberty and human rights to others.Hughes also
reported on a similar statement by Bulgaria's UN representative. When Ceylon's
representative finally came around to joining in America's censure of Himgary, the
Bulgarian delegate reminded him that: "Something worse could happen to you today if
you went to Little Rock."^°^
There were those within the black commxmity, aside from
Louis Armstrong, who voiced their support and/or provided aid to the Himgarian
refugees. At the urging of the Red Cross, a select group of black leaders issued
statements of support for Hungarian relief. These leaders included such prominent
figures in the black community as Dr. Channing H. Tobias, Chairman of the NAACP; J.
Emest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Alonzo G. Moron, President of Hampton
Institute; and E. Frederic Morrow, White House Administrative Assistant.^"^ Other black

^°^Quoted in Hughes, Fight for Freedom, pp. 157-158.
2°^Ibid., p. 158.
^"''Newspaper accoimts reported that the statements of support issued by these
black leaders all came after an appeal from the Red Cross. In a series of correspondence
with E. Frederic Morrow, the Red Cross indicated that they desperately needed his help to
"bring to the attention of all Americans this special appeal for Hungeirian relief" None of
the correspondence mentioned enlisting the support of the black community specifically.
However, the Red Cross' choice of such well-known black leaders to endorse their
campaign seemed to indicate that this was in fact the purpose. In addition, with the
exception of Morrow, there was little indication of any involvement, beyond a mere
statement of support, on the part of these black leaders. (See Wire from E. Roland

supporters of Hungarian relief included some Negro branches of the Elks Club, black
employees of the Manger Hotel in Savannah, and miscellaneous individuals.^"^ Why
these other scattered black groups and individuals supported Hungarian relief remains
somewhat unclear.^"' Some supporters, like a yoimg pastor in New Jersey, urged black
Americans to look beyond their own struggles and "demonstrate that the Negro's fight for
freedom is unselfish."^°^ The Chicago Defender's "Our Opinions" column also voiced,
with some hesitation and reservations, support for the Hungarian cause. On December
22, 1956 this column reminded readers of those white Americans, like William Lloyd
Garrison and Elijah P. Lovejoy, who had historically helped the Negro cause. This
editorial went on to argue that black Americans should "set aside their own grievances

Harriman to E. Frederic Morrow, December 5, 1956; Telegram from E. Frederic Morrow
to E. Roland Harriman, December 6, 1956; and Letter from E. Roland Harriman to E.
Frederic Morrow, January 3,1957 (all in Hungarian Relief Program, Box 1, E. Frederic
Morrow Records, Eisenhower library).
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25 and December 29, 1956, p. 31;
Associated Negro Press, 16 January 1957, Deadline, p. 9; Atlanta Daily World, 11
December 1956, p. 2 and December 22, 1956, p. 4; Chicago Defender, 22 December
1956, p. 9 and December 29, 1956, p. 8; Norfolk Journal and Guide (Home Edition), 2
February 1957, p. 3, Norfolk Journal and Guide (National-Virginia Edition), 29
December 1956, p. 20 and January 19, 1957, p. 11; and Philadelphia Afro-American, 8
December 1957, p. 18 and December 22, 1957, p. 28.
^°^lt remains unclear because most newspapers accounts simply reported the
occurrence of support with little analysis, or even indication, as to what circumstances
generated such support. In addition, there was no indication, unlike in the case of
Armstrong, of how these supporters were received by their fellow black Americans.
Amsterdam News, 22 December 1956, p. 25
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and woes to lend their might to the cause of Hungarian freedom."^"®
Of all these supporters, Morrow participated the most directly in the United
States' refugee relief efforts. In his position as White House Administrative Assistant,
Morrow played a primary role in the organization of the United States' refugee efforts. It
was his duty to locate an appropriate headquarters, hire staff, procure and dispense
supplies, handle billing concerns, and perform numerous other administrative functions
for Eisenhower's Himgarian Refugee Relief Committee. In his memoir. Black Man in the
White House, Morrow reported on the difficulties inherent in his dual role as an official
member of Eisenhower's Hungarian refugee relief team and as a prominent member of
the black community. Morrow remembered how he initially foimd himself "somewhat
surprised at the violent Negro reaction...in welcoming Hungarian refugees to this
country."^"® Morrow discussed how, as member of the President's staff, he felt an
obligation and a sense of duty to do all he could to help the incoming Himgarian refugees.
This sense of duty, however, often conflicted with Morrow's realization and
understanding of the circumstances which generated the unfavorable response of black
Americans toward Hungarian relief in the first place.^'° Morrow pointed out that: "Deep
down Negroes are sympathetic...but...how charitable can one expect him to be when he so

^°^Chicago Defender, 22 December 1956, p. 9.
Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the While House: A Diary of the Eisenhower
Years By the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, the White House, 1955-1961
fNew York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1963), p. 109.
2'%id.,pp. 109-110.
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seldom experiences this kind of charity on the part of others?"^"

Throughout the

Hungarian Crisis, black Americans repeatedly expressed their sense of anger and betrayal
at what they perceived to be inattention to both their own plight and the plight of
oppressed peoples of the Afro-Asian block. For black Americans, the intense concern for
the fate of the victims of Soviet aggression in Hungary seemed rather hypocritical when
placed along-side of inattention to aggression on the part of white colonial powers
overseas and to Jim Crow within the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the conclusion
reached by many black leaders, newspapers, and private citizens alike was that "skincolor" explained this disparity. Why else, many black Americans wondered, would their
nation rush to help white victims of oppression thousands of miles away, and ignore
abuses against its own black citizens. Black Americans further argued that, given the
United States' somewhat lackluster record on human rights, the Afro-Asian block could
not help but find America's concern for Hungary a bit hypocritical.

2"Ibid.,p. 109.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of the relatively few black Americans who supported aid for
and admission of the refugees, there remained a remarkable amoimt of consensus within
the black commimity regarding the Hungarian Crisis. This remarkable imanimity of
opinion encompassed such important differences as geography and political allegiance.
Little difference could be seen in the opinion of Northern newspapers, like the
Amsterdam News, Chicago Defender, and Pittsburgh Courier and Southern newspapers,
like the Atlanta Daily World and the Norfolk Journal and Guide. Furthermore, there was
no clear distinction between Democratic newspapers, like the Chicago Defender, and
Republican papers, like the Pittsburgh Courier. The consensus also encompassed the
statements of prominent black leaders, regularly featured black columnists and reporters,
and average black Americans. These diverse groups and individuals expressed emotions
ranging from mild aimoyance to intense bitterness to their nation's concern and care for
Hungary's refugees.
Throughout the Himgarian Crisis, mainstream public opinion argued, implicitly or
explicitly, that the United States bore some responsibility for the events in Hungary.
However, nowhere in the comments of black Americans was there any indication of a
sense that they felt that the United States had any responsibility at all for Hungary's
troubles. Furthermore, there was very little even mentioned regarding Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, or any other American propaganda efforts. Black Americans,
undoubtedly, were well aware of the existence of such activities. Why black Americans
98
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did not express the same sense of quilt and responsibility for their nation's alleged
culpability in the Hungarian Crisis stands as one of the most intriguing questions left by
their unique response. One possible explanation may lie in the deep empathy felt by
black Americans for victims of oppression in the Afro-Asian block, and the
accompanying belief that their nation bore some responsibility for this oppression. While
other Americans expressed shock at outrage that their goverrmient did not do more to
help Hungary, black Americans noted that their government and the American people in
general did little to help stop, and sometimes even tacitly aided, the past and continued
exploitation of colored peoples around the world. Perhaps black Americans' intense
belief that their nation should have felt a sense of guilt and shame for its policy in
Ethiopia, Algeria, and other similar cases left them with little inclination to consider
American complicity in Himgary.
The analogies used by black Americans in criticizing their nation's involvement
in Hungarian reftigee relief ranged from a rather long stretch to Joe Louis' tax problems,
to somewhat misguided hero-worship of Gamal Nasser, to glossing over the nuances
between internal and external aggression in South Africa and Himgary, to some very well
drawn parallels between the Ethiopia Crisis of 1935 and the Hungarian Crisis of 19561957. While some of the analogies used by black Americans might have fell short when
examined strictly from the standpoint of their accuracy and logic, they conveyed an
important underlying disaffection within the black community. For black Americans,
what Joe Louis, Gamal Nasser, the South Africans, the Ethiopians, and the numerous
other individuals or nations compared to Hungary all had in common was that they were
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dark-skinned people facing oppressive and/or xmjust white aggressors. Black Americans
consistently expressed their belief that their nation simply did not care about colored
victims of oppression overseas, or even its own black citizens.
Of all the analogies, the comparison between the tax troubles of Joe Louis and the
plight of Hungary seemed to have had the least validity. It should be noted, however, that
the association of Joe Louis with the Hungarian Crisis occurred far more frequently in
editorials sent in by private citizens than in the writings of regularly featured columnists
or statements of prominent black leaders. Irrespective of the merits of Louis' case, the
financial troubles of one very famous black American did not seem to equate with the
troubles experienced by the Hungarian refugees. Black Americans linked Louis to the
Hungarian Crisis by implying that there existed a direct connection between the seizure
of Louis' money to pay back taxes and the money being spent to help the Hungarians. In
some editorials, this argument almost seemed to degenerate into the implied assertion that
the government planned to seize the trust fund of Louis' children, just so they could give
it the incoming refugees.
While the actions of Britain, France, and Israel did deserve condemnation, the
comparisons made by black Americans between Hungary and Suez were not entirely
accurate either. The vast majority of comments found in black newspapers portrayed
Nasser as a hero and role model for dark-skinned peoples everywhere. Though most
black Americans were surely aware that Nasser ruled as a military dictator, this fact was
generally glossed over in the outpouring of praise for his defiance of Britain, France, and
Israel. Even those black Americans who had some reservations about Nasser still poured
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forth their sympathies for the common people of Egypt. Black Americans argued that
thousands of Egyptians were killed, wounded, and made homeless by this "unwarranted
attack." The praise of Nasser, particularly the comparison with the likes of the Reverend
Martin Luther King Jr., illustrated the growing pride many black Americans felt when
they witnessed members of the Afro-Asian block standing up to the old imperial powers
of Europe.
The comparison between the Himgarian Revolt and apartheid in South Africa also
tended to ignore important differences. The brutality of the treatment of South Africa's
black population was equally as inhimiane as Soviet aggression against Himgary.
However, the Chicago Defender's line of reasoning regarding UN policy in South Afnca
versus that in Hungary failed to take into account significant differences between the
UN's policy regarding internal and external aggression. The Defender argued that:
"Either the [Gjeneral [A]ssembly has the authority to consider domestic policies
[emphasis added] that come clearly within the purview of human rights or it does
not...inquiry into the racial policy of the Union is as legitimate...as that proposed for
Hungary."^'^ The United Nations' charter did not grant it the power to interfere in the
domestic affairs of its members.^'^ While the South African government was clearly
guilty of terrible violations of human rights, apartheid did in fact remain an internal.

^^^Chicago Defender, 15 December 1956, p. 9.
-'^Article 2, Section 7 of the United Nation's charter states: "Nothing contained in
the present charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
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domestic matter. Hungary, imlike South Africa, was not an issue of "domestic policy" as
implied by the Defender. The Soviet's invasion was, instead, a clear case of external
aggression against a member state. The UN's charter did, in fact, grant it the power to act
in cases, like Hungary, that were obvious examples of external aggression.
Despite the difference in the isolationism of the 1930s and the internationalism of
the Cold War, as well as the separation in time and space, the parallels between Ethiopia
and Hungary remain some of the strongest drawn by black Americans. Unlike the
comparisons to South Africa, both the Ethiopian and Hungarian Crises constituted clear
cases of outside invasion, rather than internal violations of hvmian rights. In addition,
military intervention in either Ethiopia or Hungary would have risked wide-spread
conflict and loss of American lives. When confi-onted with the Italian invasion of
Ethiopia, many Americans actively pressed their government to avoid any American
involvement. However, as black Americans pointed out, many Americans seemed all to
willing risk war on behalf of Hungary. Furthermore, the vast majority of Americans in
the 1930s did little to provide food and medical aid to Ethiopia, much less offers of
sanctuary. While the public's changing attitude toward America's role in the world,
rather than racism as was so often suggested, explained the differing response to the
Ethiopian and Hungarian Crises, black Americans did raise some very valid points.
No matter what analogy they used, or how well or poorly argued, black
Americans consistently asserted that race determined when and where their government
and fellow citizens would allow oppression and injustice to continue. Throughout the
Hungarian Crisis, black leaders, members of the media, and private citizens alike all
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asserted that their nation would not have bothered to aid the Hungarians, much less have
allowed them entry into the United States, had they been colored instead of white.
Whether or not black Americans' assertion that the United States would not have acted as
it had toward Himgary had it been an Asian or African nation wholly conveys the totality
of American foreign policy, it does suggest a lot about the experience of black Americans
leading up to and during the mid-1950s. Black Americans viewed race as playing a
primary role in America's policy toward Hxmgary because it occupied such an
omnipresent force in their own lives. Despite their official status as citizens and their
long record of service to their nation, the color of their skin continued to determine where
black Americans could work, live, attend school, and often even who their friends and
associates would be.
When the Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
many black Americans felt that, at last, things would be different. As they continued to
wait for their nation to grant them the privileges inherent in their status as citizens, they
became increasingly embittered and pessimistic about the future of America's race
relations. Then, in late 1956, black Americans witnessed their government and fellow
citizens racing to offer citizenship, housing, and jobs to a group of unknown foreigners.
This spectacle stirred deep emotions and aroused old feelings of nativism among the
black commimity. Existing nativism, combined with the climate of the 1950s, generated
annoyance, disgust, and bitterness on the part of many black Americans toward refugee
relief efforts.
Black Americans' reaction to the Hungarian Crisis was not so much a well-
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thought out and organized attempt to prevent the admission of the Hungarian refugees as
it was a series of emotional statements designed to vent their frustration, express fears,
and draw greater attention to their own struggle. Evidence of this purpose can be seen in
where and how black Americans chose to express their opposition to Hungarian refugee
relief. The vast majority of statements of black opposition appeared in black newspapers.
The only substantial group of people reading black newspapers in the 1950s were other
black Americans. Of the himdreds of letters received by Eisenhower, only four or five
appeared to have been from black Americans.^" Placed alongside of the immense
coverage of the Hungarian Revolt, these facts seem to indicate that black Americans did
not truly seek to alter the course of events. Furthermore, few statements by black
Americans argued that the United States should actually cease aid to Hungary. Most
black Americans, instead, pointed out that the concern and care given by their nation to
the situation in Hungary should also be shown on behalf of colored people overseas and
at home.^'^ Overall, the response of black Americans to the Hungarian Crisis seems to
have been deeply rooted in their intense frustration with the continuing neglect and poor
treatment received by both themselves and the peoples of Asia and Africa, rather than any

^'''If not specifically stated, the assumption of whether or not the writer was black
was generally based on area of residence and the content of the letter.
^'^For example, when the Southem Christian Leaders Conference pointed to
Eisenhower's frequent verbal condemnation of the Soviet Union and Nixon's visit to
Austria they never once argued that Eisenhower should stop condemning the Soviet
Union or Nixon should never make a trip overseas to Hungary again. Instead, they
pointed out that Eisenhower and Nixon could, and should, initiate similar actions on
behalf of equally oppressed Southem Negroes.
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particular hostility to the Hungarians themselves.
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